A provably masked implementation of BIKE Key Encapsulation Mechanism

Loïc Demange, Mélissa Rossi
{"title":"A provably masked implementation of BIKE Key Encapsulation Mechanism","authors":"Loïc Demange, Mélissa Rossi","doi":"10.62056/aesgvua5v","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"BIKE is a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) selected for the 4th round of the NIST's standardization campaign. It relies on the hardness of the syndrome decoding problem for quasi-cyclic codes and on the indistinguishability of the public key from a random element, and provides the most competitive performance among round 4 candidates, which makes it relevant for future real-world use cases. Analyzing its side-channel resistance has been highly encouraged by the community and several works have already outlined various side-channel weaknesses and proposed ad-hoc countermeasures. However, in contrast to the well-documented research line on masking lattice-based algorithms, the possibility of generically protecting code-based algorithms by masking has only been marginally studied in a 2016 paper by Chen et al. in SAC 2015. At this stage of the standardization campaign, it is important to assess the possibility of fully masking BIKE scheme and the resulting cost in terms of performances.\n In this work, we provide the first high-order masked implementation of a code-based algorithm. We had to tackle many issues such as finding proper ways to handle large sparse polynomials, masking the key-generation algorithm or keeping the benefit of the bitslicing. In this paper, we present all the gadgets necessary to provide a fully masked implementation of BIKE, we discuss our different implementation choices and we propose a full proof of masking in the Ishai Sahai and Wagner (Crypto 2003) model.\n More practically, we also provide an open C-code masked implementation of the key-generation, encapsulation and decapsulation algorithms with extensive benchmarks. While the obtained performance is slower than existing masked lattice-based algorithms, we show that masking at order 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 implies a performance penalty of x5.8, x14.2, x24.4, x38 and x55.6 compared to order 0 (unmasked and unoptimized BIKE). This scaling is encouraging and no Boolean to Arithmetic conversion has been used.","PeriodicalId":508905,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"24 11","pages":"76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.62056/aesgvua5v","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

BIKE is a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) selected for the 4th round of the NIST's standardization campaign. It relies on the hardness of the syndrome decoding problem for quasi-cyclic codes and on the indistinguishability of the public key from a random element, and provides the most competitive performance among round 4 candidates, which makes it relevant for future real-world use cases. Analyzing its side-channel resistance has been highly encouraged by the community and several works have already outlined various side-channel weaknesses and proposed ad-hoc countermeasures. However, in contrast to the well-documented research line on masking lattice-based algorithms, the possibility of generically protecting code-based algorithms by masking has only been marginally studied in a 2016 paper by Chen et al. in SAC 2015. At this stage of the standardization campaign, it is important to assess the possibility of fully masking BIKE scheme and the resulting cost in terms of performances. In this work, we provide the first high-order masked implementation of a code-based algorithm. We had to tackle many issues such as finding proper ways to handle large sparse polynomials, masking the key-generation algorithm or keeping the benefit of the bitslicing. In this paper, we present all the gadgets necessary to provide a fully masked implementation of BIKE, we discuss our different implementation choices and we propose a full proof of masking in the Ishai Sahai and Wagner (Crypto 2003) model. More practically, we also provide an open C-code masked implementation of the key-generation, encapsulation and decapsulation algorithms with extensive benchmarks. While the obtained performance is slower than existing masked lattice-based algorithms, we show that masking at order 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 implies a performance penalty of x5.8, x14.2, x24.4, x38 and x55.6 compared to order 0 (unmasked and unoptimized BIKE). This scaling is encouraging and no Boolean to Arithmetic conversion has been used.
BIKE 密钥封装机制的可证明掩码实现
BIKE 是一种后量子密钥封装机制 (KEM),被选入 NIST 标准化活动的第四轮。它依赖于准循环码综合症解码问题的硬度和公钥与随机元素的不可区分性,在第 4 轮候选机制中性能最具竞争力,因此与未来的实际应用案例息息相关。分析它的抗侧信道能力受到了业界的高度鼓励,已有几项研究概述了各种侧信道弱点,并提出了临时对策。然而,与基于网格算法的掩码研究路线形成鲜明对比的是,通过掩码对基于代码的算法进行通用保护的可能性仅在 2016 年由 Chen 等人在 SAC 2015 上发表的一篇论文中进行了少量研究。在现阶段的标准化活动中,评估完全屏蔽 BIKE 方案的可能性以及由此产生的性能代价非常重要。在这项工作中,我们首次提供了基于代码算法的高阶掩码实现。我们必须解决许多问题,如找到处理大型稀疏多项式的适当方法、屏蔽密钥生成算法或保持比特切分的优势。在本文中,我们介绍了提供完全掩码 BIKE 实现所需的所有小工具,讨论了我们的不同实现选择,并提出了 Ishai Sahai 和 Wagner(Crypto 2003)模型中的完全掩码证明。更实际的是,我们还提供了密钥生成、封装和解封装算法的开放式 C 代码掩码实现,并提供了大量基准测试。虽然所获得的性能比现有的基于屏蔽网格的算法慢,但我们表明,与阶数 0(未屏蔽和未优化的 BIKE)相比,阶数 1、2、3、4 和 5 的屏蔽意味着 x5.8、x14.2、x24.4、x38 和 x55.6 的性能损失。这种缩放令人鼓舞,而且没有使用布尔到算术的转换。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信