Promoter share pledging and dividend payouts in India: does family involvement matters?

Ankita Kalia
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Abstract

PurposeThis study aims to explore the relationship between promoter share pledging and the company’s dividend payout policy in India. Furthermore, this study also analyses the moderating impact of family involvement in business on the association between share pledging and dividend payout.Design/methodology/approachA sample of 236 companies from the S&P Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive (BSE) 500 Index (2014–2023) has been analysed through fixed-effects panel data regression. For additional testing, robustness checks include alternative measures of dividend payout and promoter share pledging, as well as alternative methodologies such as Bayesian regression. Lastly, to address potential endogeneity, instrumental variables with a two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) methodology have been implemented.FindingsUpholding the agency perspective, a significantly negative impact of promoter share pledging on corporate dividend payouts in India has been uncovered. Moreover, family involvement in business moderates this relationship, highlighting that the negative association between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts is more pronounced in family companies. The findings are consistent throughout the robustness testing.Originality/valueThe present study represents a pioneering endeavour to empirically analyse the link between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts in India. It enhances the theoretical underpinnings of the agency relationship, particularly by substantiating the existence of Type II agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. The findings of this research bear significant implications for investors, researchers and policymakers, particularly in light of the widespread prevalence of promoter-controlled entities in India.
印度的发起人股权质押和股息支付:家族参与是否重要?
目的 本研究旨在探讨印度公司发起人股权质押与公司股利支付政策之间的关系。此外,本研究还分析了家族企业参与对股权质押与股利支付之间关系的调节作用。设计/方法/途径 通过固定效应面板数据回归分析了标准普尔孟买证券交易所敏感指数(BSE)500 指数(2014-2023 年)中的 236 家公司样本。为了进行更多测试,稳健性检查包括股息支付和发起人股权质押的替代衡量方法,以及贝叶斯回归等替代方法。最后,为了解决潜在的内生性问题,我们采用了两阶段最小二乘法(IV-2SLS)的工具变量。此外,家族企业参与调节了这一关系,突出表明在家族企业中,发起人股权质押与股息支付之间的负相关更为明显。在整个稳健性测试过程中,研究结果都是一致的。原创性/价值本研究是对印度发起人股权质押与股息支付之间的联系进行实证分析的一项开创性工作。它加强了代理关系的理论基础,特别是证实了大股东和小股东之间存在第二类代理冲突。本研究的结论对投资者、研究人员和政策制定者具有重要意义,特别是考虑到印度普遍存在发起人控制的实体。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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