Social norms and the dynamics of observers' education

Abstract

The paper presents a dynamical extension of the well­known Bernheim— Cartwright—Patel model of conformism. In this model the signaling equilibrium is a result of the optimal choice of an individual when he/she maximizes his/ her utility by choosing a donation in the amount x. In doing this the individual takes into account the intrinsic utility based on the generosity type t, and social attitude expressed by two types of observers: rational and naïve. Such an attitude significantly depends on social norms in this society and affects the esteem of the individual. Social attitude toward generosity varies within the broad range and at its endpoints leads to either neglect of the society (I do not care what people think of me) or an ideal conformism when a person chooses the same x as the rest of the public. Cartwright and Patel have shown that the presence of the inexperienced observers greatly affects equilibrium. This paper explores the dynamics of the naïve observers when they are informed by the rational ones. The dynamic law in the form of the differential equation was set and the stable steady­state solutions were found. Besides, while working on the dynamic law some clarifications of the preceding results of the original model were done.