English metro-mayors

Abstract

Evidence from GM and the LCR demonstrates that policy activity was a central mechanism by which the metro-mayors, working with and through their combined authorities, contributed to evolving the office and ensuring it became, if not embedded, then more mature. Transport is the policy field where the metro-mayors were directly accorded their principal ‘hard’ power and here they sought to make maximum impact with a visible public issue. Transport afforded the metro-mayors the opportunity to demonstrate to the public the worth of their office – in Burnham's case by returning the buses to greater public control and extending the metro system, and in Rotheram's case by enhancing what was already a well-regarded public transport system. While transport policy showed the possibilities of the metro-mayors, it also illustrated the constraints on their powers. On the central question of the High Speed 2 (HS2) rail project and its connection to Liverpool and an underground station at Piccadilly to accommodate it, the crucial actors in the policy network – the Treasury, the Department for Transport and the prime minister – used their power to frustrate. Both metro-mayors protested about their lack of influence over a range of transport issues, such as the failures of the major train companies to run efficient or sufficient services and the inadequacy of the policies of the Ministry of Transport.

The main justification for the MCAs was to enhance regional economic development. In their economic policy, the metro-mayors were prone towards boosterism and ‘grand projets’ but, in the case of Labour metro-mayors, a distinct contribution lies in marrying economic policy to social objectives under the banner of inclusive growth. This has taken shape through initiatives such as the Good Employment Charter in GM and its equivalent, the Fair Employment Charter, in the LCR, and schemes such as Households into Work (the LCR) and Working Well (GM), which were devolved to the MCAs to assist ‘hard to reach’ families back into the labour market. It seems most likely that, in the next stage of the devolution journey, metro-mayors will be able to extend their control over skills policy as a place-based strategy, building on the existing power to manage the adult education budget to improve productivity and reduce reliance on imported labour – both central objectives of government policy.

Both Rotheram and Burnham self-styled themselves as ‘place-based’ leaders despite the scepticism of local council leaders who, in our interviews, asserted that their concern has always been with place. Yet their party and ideological roots were clear through their stance on rough sleeping and planning and regulation in wider policy areas. The rough-sleeping initiative is a policy area where neither metro-mayors nor the MCAs enjoy formal powers. Yet, through informal generative powers7 such as the power to convene and to focus on issues, both metro-mayors have displayed their ability to take a holistic approach to policymaking and to mobilise networks and dispersed resources. They exploit generative powers as convenors of summits, and they use ‘voice’ to advocate innovative policies and future visions. Rotheram, for example, convened summits to promote apprenticeships, which involved him in the co-production of policies with the local enterprise partnership. Burnham's equivalent was to hold green summits to focus on the environment as that issue increased in salience and digital summits to promote digitalisation throughout the private and public sectors.

Metro-mayors, as directly elected leaders, often enjoy a visibility and legitimacy unavailable to indirectly elected council leaders. Burnham and Rotheram acted as a focal point for their city-regions locally and nationally and each possessed the authority bestowed by a personal profile endorsed by the electorate, which is attracted to personality politics, and a status conferred by the wider geographic scale of the territory and its economic base. Yet visibility is not a given and depends on leadership skills, experience and personality. The two metro-mayors have differed in terms of their profile, with Burnham clearly the more visible of the two, particularly on the national stage. The degree to which metro-mayors develop these instruments of power is thus variable, but Burnham and Rotheram illustrate the importance of their own agency.

As Burnham has expressed it, there is little that he can “mandate”.8 In the context of limited and very specific judicial powers, metro-mayors therefore rely on the generative powers of ‘voice’ and galvanising and convening people to work towards a shared vision. In this context, building and sustaining relationships is the enabling factor par excellence for MCAs to work.