Research on evolutionary game of digital twin data information sharing based on blockchain technology

Yuchen Zhu
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Abstract

Due to the significant characteristics of decentralization and tamper resistance of blockchain technology, it helps to solve the problems of timeliness and slow permission control in traditional information sharing. However, most researchers are committed to exploring how to improve the efficiency, reliability, and privacy security of digital twin data. There is a lack of research on issues such as blockchain participants free-riding and not actively participating in information sharing, and how to promote information sharing through incentives. Therefore, this paper designs a distance grouping based practical byzantine fault tolerance consensus algorithm to address the credibility issue of transmitted data, thereby improving the efficiency of negotiation. The feasibility of the algorithm is verified through cases analysis. In addition, for the problem of low subjective willingness of information sharing, this paper designs an information sharing incentive strategy based on blockchain intelligent contracts, establishes digital twin data sharing evolutionary game models with reputation incentives and non-reputation incentives, so as to explore the impact of reputation incentive on evolutionary stability strategies. Finally, simulation analysis is conducted on the evolutionary game model of digital twin data sharing. The impact of several key indicators such as data complementarity, trust, positive incentive coefficient, and data sharing cost on the evolution process of information sharing are considered, and corresponding management insights are obtained.
基于区块链技术的数字孪生数据信息共享进化博弈研究
由于区块链技术具有去中心化、防篡改等显著特点,有助于解决传统信息共享中的时效性、权限控制慢等问题。然而,大多数研究人员致力于探索如何提高数字孪生数据的效率、可靠性和隐私安全性。而对于区块链参与者搭便车、不积极参与信息共享,以及如何通过激励机制促进信息共享等问题的研究还比较缺乏。因此,本文设计了一种基于距离分组的实用拜占庭容错共识算法,以解决传输数据的可信度问题,从而提高协商效率。通过案例分析,验证了算法的可行性。此外,针对信息共享主观意愿低的问题,本文设计了基于区块链智能合约的信息共享激励策略,建立了声誉激励和非声誉激励的数字孪生数据共享演化博弈模型,从而探索声誉激励对演化稳定策略的影响。最后,对数字孪生数据共享演化博弈模型进行了仿真分析。考虑了数据互补性、信任度、正激励系数、数据共享成本等几个关键指标对信息共享演化过程的影响,并获得了相应的管理启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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