Mental Causation for Standard Dualists

IF 1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-04-18 DOI:10.1080/00048402.2024.2335325

Bram Vaassen

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The standard objection to dualist theories of mind is that they seemingly cannot account for the obvious fact that mental phenomena cause our behaviour. On the plausible assumption that all our beh...

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标准二元论者的心理因果关系

对二元论心灵理论的标准反对意见是，它们似乎无法解释心理现象导致我们行为这一显而易见的事实。在我们所有的行为都是由心理现象引起的这一貌似合理的假设下，二元论心智理论似乎无法解释这一显而易见的事实。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Australasian Journal of Philosophy (AJP) is one of the world''s leading philosophy journals. Founded in 1923, it has been continuously published ever since. It is recognized as one of the best in the analytic tradition, but is not narrow in what it regards as worthy of acceptance. Heavily cited in the general philosophical literature, it is covered by all the major abstracting and indexing services, including the Arts and Humanities Citation Index® which provides access to current and retrospective bibliographic information and cited references found in the world''s leading arts and humanities journals. In addition to Articles and Discussion Notes, the journal publishes Book Reviews and Book Notes as well as occasional commissioned Critical Notices. The journal is read world-wide and has recently published contributions from North and South American, European and Asian as well as Australasian authors.