{"title":"The Voice of Risk: Wall Street CEOs' Voice Pitch and the 2008 Financial Crisis*","authors":"Andy Kim, Min Jung Kang, Sijia Cao, Soohyun Park","doi":"10.1111/ajfs.12471","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The pitch of a male voice is an honest signal of his threat potential coming from testosterone. Recognizing endogenous matches between firms and CEOs, we propose to use voice pitch of the CEO as a proxy for the unobservable risk-taking strategy of the firm. Using digitally analyzed male CEO voice pitch in 167 CNBC interviews during the 2008 global financial crisis, we find that deep-voiced Wall Street CEOs (i) managed riskier firms, (ii) received more equity-based compensation before the crisis and (iii) were more likely to be fired after the crisis, controlling for economic incentives, overconfidence, and narcissism.</p>","PeriodicalId":8570,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies","volume":"53 2","pages":"200-237"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajfs.12471","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajfs.12471","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The pitch of a male voice is an honest signal of his threat potential coming from testosterone. Recognizing endogenous matches between firms and CEOs, we propose to use voice pitch of the CEO as a proxy for the unobservable risk-taking strategy of the firm. Using digitally analyzed male CEO voice pitch in 167 CNBC interviews during the 2008 global financial crisis, we find that deep-voiced Wall Street CEOs (i) managed riskier firms, (ii) received more equity-based compensation before the crisis and (iii) were more likely to be fired after the crisis, controlling for economic incentives, overconfidence, and narcissism.