Forming an Agreement between Buyers of Frequencies for Open Access at a Spectrum Auction

Moscow University Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI:10.3103/s0278641924010059

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Abstract

The problem of an unadvertised agreement between buyers of non-exclusive rights at a spectrum auction for the agreed formation of price bids is considered from the viewpoint of game theory and operations research. Such auction participants are potential freeriders claiming free access to the frequencies being sold, which results in their non-standard behavior. Two ways of organizing an agreement for an auction with pricing according to the Vickrey rule are proposed for the full awareness of the participants about the amount of income of the partners from using the range of frequencies purchased by pooling. It is shown that the lack of information results in an equal distribution of payment between negotiating buyers, and this greatly reduces their competitive advantage in a spectrum auction. The Clarke–Groves mechanism that stimulates the identification of true preferences is analyzed and a modified version of it is developed. Unfortunately, analysis shows it does not make sense for any of them to be applied to this problem. An alternative way of choosing a joint solution based on the Germeyer–Vatel model is discussed.

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在频谱拍卖中为开放使用频率的买方之间签订协议

摘要本文从博弈论和运筹学的角度探讨了在频谱拍卖中，非独占权买方之间为商定出价而达成的非公开协议问题。这类拍卖参与者是潜在的自由人，他们要求免费获得所拍卖的频率，这导致了他们的非标准行为。本文提出了两种根据维克里规则定价的拍卖协议组织方式，让参与者充分了解合作伙伴从使用集合购买的频率范围中获得的收入数额。结果表明，由于缺乏信息，谈判买方之间的付款分配是均等的，这大大降低了他们在频谱拍卖中的竞争优势。本文分析了克拉克-格罗夫斯机制对识别真实偏好的激励作用，并对其进行了改进。不幸的是，分析表明，任何一种机制应用于这一问题都没有意义。讨论了基于 Germeyer-Vatel 模型选择联合解决方案的另一种方法。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Moscow University Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics

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