{"title":"Household specialization and competition for promotion","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11150-024-09706-9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>We study how the presence of promotion competition in the labor market affects household specialization patterns. By embedding a promotion tournament model in a household setting, we show that specialization can emerge as a consequence of competitive work incentives. This specialization outcome, in which only one spouse invests heavily in his or her career, can be welfare superior to a situation in which both spouses invest equally in their careers. The reason is that household specialization reduces the intensity of competition and provides households with consumption smoothing. The specialization result is obtained in a setting where spouses are equally competitive in the labor market and there is no household production. It is also robust to several modifications of the model, such as varying the number of households, two spouses competing for promotion in the same workplace, and the inclusion of household production.</p>","PeriodicalId":47111,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economics of the Household","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Economics of the Household","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-024-09706-9","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We study how the presence of promotion competition in the labor market affects household specialization patterns. By embedding a promotion tournament model in a household setting, we show that specialization can emerge as a consequence of competitive work incentives. This specialization outcome, in which only one spouse invests heavily in his or her career, can be welfare superior to a situation in which both spouses invest equally in their careers. The reason is that household specialization reduces the intensity of competition and provides households with consumption smoothing. The specialization result is obtained in a setting where spouses are equally competitive in the labor market and there is no household production. It is also robust to several modifications of the model, such as varying the number of households, two spouses competing for promotion in the same workplace, and the inclusion of household production.
期刊介绍：
The Review of Economics of the Household publishes high-quality empirical and theoretical research on the economic behavior and decision-making processes of single and multi-person households. The Review is not wedded to any particular models or methods. It welcomes both macro-economic and micro-level applications. Household decisions analyzed in this journal include · household production of human capital, health, nutrition/food, childcare, and eldercare, · well-being of persons living in households, issues of gender and power, · fertility and risky behaviors, · consumption, savings and wealth accumulation, · labor force participation and time use,· household formation (including marriage, cohabitation and fertility) and dissolution,· migration, intergenerational transfers,· experiments involving households,· religiosity and civility.The journal is particularly interested in policy-relevant economic analyses and equally interested in applications to countries at various levels of economic development. The Perspectives section covers articles on the history of economic thought and review articles. Officially cited as: Rev Econ Household
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