Safeguarding proprietary information in the supply chain and relationship-specific investments

IF 2.6 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
In Ji Jang, Kristina Minnick, Alok Nemani
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We examine whether the risk of losing proprietary information through the supply chain affects relationship-specific investment (RSI) decisions by supply chain partners. Using state courts' staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) as a shock to the firm's ability to protect proprietary information, we find that customers increase RSI when their supplier is headquartered in a state that adopts IDD. The effect is more substantial for customers who face a higher risk of losing proprietary information and with suppliers that are difficult to substitute. IDD also plays a more prominent role in the absence of alternate mechanisms that reduce contracting frictions, such as shared directors, common ownership, or joint ventures. Our results are robust to using cross-citation measures of RSI and alternative estimations that mitigate potential biases arising from the staggered difference-in-difference approach. Our findings suggest that proprietary information protection enables firms to reduce contracting frictions arising in supply chain relations.

保护供应链和特定关系投资中的专有信息
我们研究了通过供应链丢失专有信息的风险是否会影响供应链合作伙伴的特定关系投资(RSI)决策。利用各州法院交错采用 "不可避免披露原则"(IDD)作为对公司保护专有信息能力的冲击,我们发现当供应商的总部位于采用 IDD 的州时,客户会增加 RSI。对于那些面临较高专有信息丢失风险的客户和难以替代的供应商来说,这种影响更为显著。在缺乏减少契约摩擦的替代机制(如共享董事、共同所有权或合资企业)的情况下,IDD 的作用也更为显著。使用交叉引用的 RSI 测量方法和其他估算方法来减轻交错差分法可能产生的偏差,我们的结果都是稳健的。我们的研究结果表明,专有信息保护能使企业减少供应链关系中产生的契约摩擦。
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来源期刊
FINANCIAL REVIEW
FINANCIAL REVIEW BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
3.30
自引率
28.10%
发文量
39
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