Confusion and explanation

IF 1.8 3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS
Mind & Language Pub Date : 2024-04-15 DOI:10.1111/mila.12510
Rachel Goodman
{"title":"Confusion and explanation","authors":"Rachel Goodman","doi":"10.1111/mila.12510","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In <jats:italic>Talking about</jats:italic>, Unnsteinsson defends an <jats:italic>intentionalist</jats:italic> theory of reference by arguing that confused referential intentions degrade reference. Central to this project is a “belief model” of both identity confusion and unconfused thought. By appealing to a well‐known argument from Campbell, I argue that this belief model falls short, because it fails to explain the inferential behavior it promises to explain. Campbell's argument has been central in the contemporary literature on Frege's puzzle, but Unnsteinsson's account of confusion provides an opportunity for more clarity about how the argument is best interpreted, and what it shows.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mind & Language","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12510","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LINGUISTICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

In Talking about, Unnsteinsson defends an intentionalist theory of reference by arguing that confused referential intentions degrade reference. Central to this project is a “belief model” of both identity confusion and unconfused thought. By appealing to a well‐known argument from Campbell, I argue that this belief model falls short, because it fails to explain the inferential behavior it promises to explain. Campbell's argument has been central in the contemporary literature on Frege's puzzle, but Unnsteinsson's account of confusion provides an opportunity for more clarity about how the argument is best interpreted, and what it shows.
困惑与解释
在《谈论》一书中,昂斯廷森为意向主义的参照理论辩护,认为混乱的参照意向会降低参照的质量。这个项目的核心是一个关于身份混淆和无混淆思维的 "信念模型"。通过引用坎贝尔的一个著名论点,我认为这个信念模型是不完善的,因为它无法解释它所承诺解释的推论行为。坎贝尔的论证在当代关于弗雷格之谜的文献中一直占据着核心地位,但乌恩斯坦松关于混淆的论述为我们提供了一个机会,使我们能够更加清晰地了解如何对这一论证进行最佳诠释,以及这一论证所展示的内容。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
Mind & Language
Mind & Language Multiple-
CiteScore
4.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
58
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信