Understanding the First Paralogism: A Friendly Disagreement

IF 1.1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Kantian Review Pub Date : 2024-04-04 DOI:10.1017/s1369415424000128

Patricia Kitcher

引用次数: 0

Abstract

My comments focus on Proops’s treatment of the Paralogisms. I agree with many aspects of his discussion, including his views about the project of Rational Psychology and his analyses of how, exactly, the arguments of the Paralogisms are defective in form, but I disagree with his interpretation of the First Paralogism. I argue that the source of confusion that Kant diagnoses is not the grammatical distribution of ‘I’ as singular, but the fact that the I-representation is both empty and necessary for cognition.

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理解第一个 Paralogism：友好的分歧

我的评论主要集中在普罗普斯对《类比论》的处理上。我同意他讨论的许多方面，包括他对理性心理学项目的看法，以及他对 "类比论 "的论证在形式上究竟如何存在缺陷的分析，但我不同意他对 "第一类比论 "的解释。我认为，康德所诊断的困惑的根源不在于 "我 "作为单数的语法分布，而在于 "我 "的表征既是空的，又是认知所必需的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Kantian Review PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.00

自引率

20.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The journal aims to publish the best contemporary work on Kant and Kantian issues and places an emphasis on those current philosophical debates which reflect a Kantian influence. Almost all recent Western philosophy makes some reference to the work of Kant, either consciously rejecting or consciously endorsing some aspect of that work. In epistemology, in philosophy of mind and language, in moral and political philosophy, and in aesthetics, such Kantian influences are widely acknowledged and extensively discussed. Kant"s work has also increasingly become a concern for the social and political sciences. The journal strengthens this interest both by establishing interpretations of Kant"s own writing and by discussing the substance of the related current philosophical debates.