Technology-Enabled Agent Choice and Uptake of Social Assistance Programs: Evidence from India’s Food Security Program

Rakesh Allu, Maya Ganesh, Sarang Deo, Sripad K. Devalkar
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Abstract

Problem definition: Beneficiaries of social assistance programs with transfers of undifferentiated commodities often have a designated agent to collect their entitlements from. This gives monopoly power to agents over beneficiaries. When coupled with weak government monitoring, agents do not have incentives to adhere to stipulated operating guidelines, leading to reduced uptake by beneficiaries. Some governments are attempting to break the monopoly by allowing beneficiaries to choose agents. However, the impact of choice on uptake may be limited by lack of alternate agents in beneficiaries’ vicinities, restricted ability of agents to compete with undifferentiated commodities, and collusion among agents. Methodology/results: Using a reverse difference-in-differences framework on data from a food security program in two neighboring states in India, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, we find that providing agent choice results in a 6.6% increase in the quantity of entitlements collected by the beneficiary households. We also find that increase in uptake is about four times higher in regions with high agent density compared with those with low agent density. This emphasizes the importance of having an alternate agent in the vicinity for choice to be effective. Nearly all of the increase in uptake is attributable to new beneficiaries collecting entitlements from their preassigned agent. This is suggestive of agents improving adherence to operating guidelines in response to choice. We find associative evidence for this response in the number of days agents keep their shops open. Managerial implications: Governments executing in-kind transfers of undifferentiated commodities are piloting interventions to provide choice to their beneficiaries. Replacement of in-kind transfers with cash, an increasingly popular intervention, may be challenging in volatile markets, as the magnitude of the transfer needs to be periodically adjusted. Our results indicate that alternate designs of providing choice even in a limited form, that is, the place where the beneficiaries can collect their entitlements with products and prices fixed, can present a viable alternative.Funding: This research was partially supported by a grant from the Omidyar Network to the Digital Identity Research Initiative at the Indian School of Business.Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0528 .
技术驱动的代理人选择与社会援助计划的采用:印度粮食安全计划的证据
问题的定义:转移无差别商品的社会援助计划的受益人通常都有一个指定的代理机构来收取他们的应享权利。这使代理机构对受益人拥有垄断权。再加上政府监管不力,代理机构没有动力遵守规定的操作指南,导致受益人的领取率下降。一些政府正试图打破垄断,允许受益人选择代理机构。然而,由于受益人附近缺乏替代代理机构,代理机构与无差别商品竞争的能力受到限制,以及代理机构之间相互串通,选择代理机构对吸收量的影响可能有限。方法/结果:通过对印度安得拉邦(Andhra Pradesh)和特伦甘纳邦(Telangana)两个相邻邦的粮食安全项目数据进行反向差异分析,我们发现,提供代理人选择可使受益家庭领取的津贴数量增加 6.6%。我们还发现,与代理人密度低的地区相比,代理人密度高的地区的领取率提高了约四倍。这强调了在附近有一个替代代理人对有效选择的重要性。几乎所有参与率的增长都归功于新受益人从其预先指定的代理处领取应享权利。这表明代理人在选择后会更好地遵守操作指南。我们从代理店的营业天数中发现了这一反应的相关证据。管理意义:执行无差别商品实物转移的政府正在试行干预措施,为受益人提供选择。以现金取代实物转移这一日益流行的干预措施,在市场动荡的情况下可能具有挑战性,因为转移的规模需要定期调整。我们的研究结果表明,即使是以有限的形式提供选择,即受益人可以在产品和价格固定的地方领取他们的应享权利,这种替代设计也是一种可行的选择:本研究得到了奥米迪亚网络(Omidyar Network)对印度商学院数字身份研究计划的部分资助:在线附录见 https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0528 。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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