Moderatism and Truth

IF 1.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Santiago Echeverri
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

According to moderatism, perceptual justification requires that one independently takes for granted propositional hinges. This view faces the truth problem: to offer an account of truth for hinges that is not threatened by skepticism. Annalisa Coliva has tried to solve the truth problem by developing a new form of alethic pluralism. I argue that the resulting view cannot offer a coherent characterization of “skeptical switch scenarios” while providing an effective anti-skeptical strategy. In a more positive vein, I defend an approach that combines a correspondence conception of truth with epistemological disjunctivism.
温和主义与真理
根据温和主义,知觉的合理性要求人们独立地将命题铰链视为理所当然。这种观点面临着真理问题:为铰链提供一个不受怀疑论威胁的真理解释。安娜丽萨-科利娃(Annalisa Coliva)试图通过发展一种新形式的阿勒泰多元论来解决真理问题。我认为,由此产生的观点无法在提供有效的反怀疑策略的同时,为 "怀疑论转换情景 "提供一个连贯的表征。在更积极的方面,我为一种将真理的对应概念与认识论的非并列性相结合的方法辩护。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
11.10%
发文量
16
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