Virtue Ethics as Animal Ethics in Philosophy of the Islamic World

Peter Adamson, Bligh Somma
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Abstract

Virtue ethics may seem to be a less useful paradigm for ethical thinking than utilitarianism and deontology, insofar as it seems rather vacuous to be told to act as a virtuous person would act. But the topic considered here shows that this need not be true. Since virtue ethicists (and virtuous persons, according to this ethical approach) value the features that make human lives (more) excellent, they also value the features that make other lives (more) excellent, by way of the virtues of mercy, generosity, and justice. And this is true whether or not the lives in question are human or animal. To put it another way, a good agent will be one who shows goodness towards beings who are capable of having good lives. While that phrasing again sounds close to tautologous, it becomes substantive when we spell out which beings have such a capacity, and in what ways things can go well or badly for them. Virtue ethicists from the Islamic world were especially well placed to do that, since they also inherited from Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) a teleological conception of nature. In light of this, it comes to seem almost inevitable that philosophers in this tradition would endorse compassionate treatment of animals. In cases where they fail to do so, the failure is bound up with a tendency to downgrade the value of practical virtue as a whole. Rigorously intellectualist ascetics are unlikely to show much interest in the welfare of animals, being disinterested even in their own animal souls.
伊斯兰世界哲学中作为动物伦理学的美德伦理学
与功利主义和道义论相比,美德伦理学似乎是一种不那么有用的伦理思考范式,因为告诉人们要像一个有美德的人那样行事似乎相当空洞。但本文所探讨的话题表明,事实并非如此。由于美德伦理学家(根据这种伦理方法,美德之人)重视使人类生活(更加)美好的特征,他们也重视通过仁慈、慷慨和正义等美德使其他生活(更加)美好的特征。无论这些生命是人类的还是动物的,都是如此。换一种说法,一个好的代理人应该是对那些能够拥有美好生活的生命表现出善意的人。虽然这种说法听起来又近乎同义反复,但当我们明确指出哪些生命具有这种能力,以及对他们来说事情会在哪些方面顺利或不顺利时,这种说法就变得具有实质意义了。伊斯兰世界的美德伦理学家在这方面尤为擅长,因为他们也继承了亚里士多德(公元前 322 年)的目的论自然观。有鉴于此,这一传统中的哲学家赞同以同情的态度对待动物,似乎几乎是不可避免的。如果哲学家们未能做到这一点,那么他们的失败与贬低实践美德整体价值的倾向是分不开的。严谨的知识分子禁欲主义者不太可能对动物的福利表现出太大的兴趣,他们甚至对自己的动物灵魂也不感兴趣。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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