{"title":"E-Tenon: An efficient privacy-preserving secure open data sharing scheme for EHR system","authors":"P. Gope, Zhihui Lin, Yang Yang, Jianting Ning","doi":"10.3233/jcs-220097","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The transition from paper-based information to Electronic-Health-Records (EHRs) has driven various advancements in the modern healthcare industry. In many cases, patients need to share their EHR with healthcare professionals. Given the sensitive and security-critical nature of EHRs, it is essential to consider the security and privacy issues of storing and sharing EHR. However, existing security solutions excessively encrypt the whole database, thus requiring the entire database to be decrypted for each access request, which is time-consuming. On the other hand, the use of EHR for medical research (e.g., development of precision medicine and diagnostics techniques) and optimisation of practices in healthcare organisations require the EHR to be analysed. To achieve that, they should be easily accessible without compromising the patient’s privacy. In this paper, we propose an efficient technique called E-Tenon that not only securely keeps all EHR publicly accessible but also provides the desired security features. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in which an Open Database is used for protecting EHR. The proposed E-Tenon empowers patients to securely share their EHR under their own multi-level, fine-grained access policies. Analyses show that our system outperforms existing solutions in terms of computational complexity.","PeriodicalId":46074,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Computer Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Computer Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-220097","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The transition from paper-based information to Electronic-Health-Records (EHRs) has driven various advancements in the modern healthcare industry. In many cases, patients need to share their EHR with healthcare professionals. Given the sensitive and security-critical nature of EHRs, it is essential to consider the security and privacy issues of storing and sharing EHR. However, existing security solutions excessively encrypt the whole database, thus requiring the entire database to be decrypted for each access request, which is time-consuming. On the other hand, the use of EHR for medical research (e.g., development of precision medicine and diagnostics techniques) and optimisation of practices in healthcare organisations require the EHR to be analysed. To achieve that, they should be easily accessible without compromising the patient’s privacy. In this paper, we propose an efficient technique called E-Tenon that not only securely keeps all EHR publicly accessible but also provides the desired security features. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in which an Open Database is used for protecting EHR. The proposed E-Tenon empowers patients to securely share their EHR under their own multi-level, fine-grained access policies. Analyses show that our system outperforms existing solutions in terms of computational complexity.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Computer Security presents research and development results of lasting significance in the theory, design, implementation, analysis, and application of secure computer systems and networks. It will also provide a forum for ideas about the meaning and implications of security and privacy, particularly those with important consequences for the technical community. The Journal provides an opportunity to publish articles of greater depth and length than is possible in the proceedings of various existing conferences, while addressing an audience of researchers in computer security who can be assumed to have a more specialized background than the readership of other archival publications.