A new formal model analysis of deterrent to brinkmanship and the causes of the armament dilemma

Abstract

How close does a nation come to the brink of war with an opponent during the process of crisis bargaining? The present study constructs a new formal model focused on a challenger’s incentive to intensify military provocations against a defender that involve a trade-off between securing a more profitable bargaining outcome and increasing the risk of accidental war. This model identifies the conditions under which the defender’s threat of military coercion effectively deters the challenger from engaging in his payoff-maximizing level of provocations. The numerical simulations suggest that a military buildup by a nation can cause counterintuitive results, namely, the armament dilemma, depending on the balance of the marginal benefits and costs for participants and the effectiveness of deterrence. Meanwhile, a state’s military buildup always strengthens its own bargaining power relative to its opponent’s regardless of the occurrence of this dilemma; that is, the paradox of power does not arise.