Generic and Cost effective framework for Space Threat Assessment for Emerging Space Economies

Ramesh Kumar Venkatesan, Loganathan Muthusamy
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Abstract

Modern-day satellites can be considered mini-computers orbiting the earth, with their own operating systems, customized software, navigation and processing units, in-built memory, and other optical and communication capabilities. Gone are the days when satellites were huge in size, with systems and sub-systems taking several months to a few years to be manufactured, assembled, tested, and launched depending on the mission. A wide variety of technological developments in the past decades, including miniaturization of systems and subsystems, availability of space-qualified and commercially-off-the-shelf (COTS) components, and the advent of application-specific integrated chips (ASICs) have paved the way for an increase in quantity and quality of space-based systems, thereby enabling a wide variety of missions even for emerging space economies. With the growing number and complexity of satellites, there have been multiple recorded instances of attacks that have happened on space and ground-based systems over the last three decades. For example, in 1986, the Galaxy I satellite uplink was disrupted by a suspicious person from Florida under the pseudonym "Captain Midnight". In 1997, computers belonging to the X-ray astrophysics section of the Goddard Space Flight Center campus were compromised. In 1998, the ROSAT X-RAY satellite co-owned by the United States and Germany was hacked. One of the satellites from the military communication system Skynet - owned and operated by the UK's Royal Air Force was hacked. As we enter the space age, it is important to note that many countries, including underdeveloped nations, utilize satellites for various earth-based and space-based applications, military recon missions, interplanetary missions, and all other types of space exploration. Given the extent of utilization, it is crucial to tackle the threats facing space-based and ground-based systems. Some developed and space-faring nations like the USA, Russia, China, the UK, etc., have counter-space capabilities at present to tackle a wide variety of threats. On the other hand, countries like India, Iran, Australia, New Zealand, and UAE, which are still new or emerging players in the new space industry, are still developing their systems to be robust enough to tackle space-based and ground-based threats. At the farther end are countries like Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Norway, etc., which are still developing their space capabilities. In this concise abstract, we present an overview of the myriad security threats encountered by both space-based and ground-based systems. Additionally, we introduce a generic and cost-effective threat assessment framework designed to evaluate these threats across diverse scenarios. This mission-agnostic framework, along with its brief methodology, serves as a foundational tool for identifying security vulnerabilities and formulating comprehensive risk mitigation strategies tailored to specific missions. In the subsequent full-length article, we delve deeper into the complexities of space security, exploring real-world examples, emerging challenges, and innovative solutions.
新兴空间经济体空间威胁评估的通用和成本效益框架
现代卫星可被视为环绕地球运行的小型计算机,拥有自己的操作系统、定制软件、导航和处理单元、内置存储器以及其他光学和通信功能。过去,卫星体积庞大,系统和子系统的制造、组装、测试和发射需要几个月到几年的时间,这取决于卫星的任务。过去几十年来,各种技术的发展,包括系统和子系统的小型化、符合太空标准的商用现货供应(COTS)组件的可用性,以及专用集成芯片(ASIC)的出现,为提高天基系统的数量和质量铺平了道路,从而使甚至新兴太空经济体也能执行各种各样的任务。随着卫星的数量和复杂性不断增加,在过去三十年中,发生了多起针对空间和地面系统的攻击事件。例如,1986 年,"银河一号 "卫星的上行链路被一名来自佛罗里达、化名为 "午夜船长 "的可疑人物破坏。1997 年,戈达德太空飞行中心园区 X 射线天体物理学部门的计算机遭到入侵。1998 年,美国和德国共同拥有的 ROSAT X-RAY 卫星遭到黑客攻击。由英国皇家空军拥有和运营的军事通信系统 "天网 "的一颗卫星被黑客入侵。随着我们进入太空时代,必须指出的是,包括不发达国家在内的许多国家都在利用卫星进行各种地基和天基应用、军事侦察任务、星际飞行任务以及所有其他类型的太空探索。鉴于卫星的广泛使用,解决天基和地基系统面临的威胁至关重要。一些发达国家和航天国家,如美国、俄罗斯、中国、英国等,目前都拥有应对各种威胁的反太空能力。另一方面,印度、伊朗、澳大利亚、新西兰和阿联酋等国家在新的太空产业中仍是新的或新兴的参与者,它们仍在开发足以应对天基和地基威胁的系统。而蒙古、尼泊尔、斯里兰卡、柬埔寨、挪威等国家则仍在发展自己的太空能力。在这篇简短的摘要中,我们概述了天基和地基系统所遇到的各种安全威胁。此外,我们还介绍了一个通用的、具有成本效益的威胁评估框架,该框架旨在评估不同情况下的这些威胁。这个与任务无关的框架及其简要方法可作为识别安全漏洞和制定针对特定任务的全面风险缓解战略的基础工具。在随后的长篇文章中,我们将深入探讨太空安全的复杂性,探讨现实世界中的实例、新出现的挑战和创新解决方案。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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