From bonus to burden: The cost of ruling from a new(s) perspective

IF 3.6 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
GUNNAR THESEN, CHRISTOFFER GREEN-PEDERSEN, PETER MORTENSEN
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Studies have repeatedly documented the cost of ruling: governing parties generally suffer electoral defeats. We approach this empirical law of political science from the perspective of another empirical law: the incumbency bonus, the fact that incumbents get more media attention than the opposition. Our claim is that the bonus constitutes an electoral liability because it reflects the critical approach of media to government power. News featuring incumbents is therefore associated with a more negative tone than news featuring the opposition. This incumbency burden in turn affects government support negatively. Empirically, we draw on an extensive news corpus covering four European countries over two decades, combined with monthly poll data. Analyses show that the incumbency burden in political news is an empirical reality, and that variations in the burden contribute substantially to predictions of government support. Finally, the negative burden effect is stronger for single-party cabinets, but stable throughout government tenure.

Abstract Image

从奖金到负担:从新角度看执政成本
研究反复证明了执政的代价:执政党通常会在选举中失败。我们从另一个经验法则的角度来探讨政治学的这一经验法则:在位奖金,即在位者比反对党获得更多媒体关注的事实。我们的主张是,这种红利构成了一种选举责任,因为它反映了媒体对政府权力的批判态度。因此,与报道反对党的新闻相比,报道在任者的新闻会带有更多负面色彩。这种在职负担反过来又会对政府的支持率产生负面影响。在实证研究中,我们利用了涵盖四个欧洲国家、长达二十年的大量新闻素材,并结合了月度民调数据。分析表明,政治新闻中的在职负担是一个经验现实,而在职负担的变化对政府支持率的预测有很大影响。最后,一党内阁的负面负担效应更强,但在整个政府任期内保持稳定。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.00
自引率
5.70%
发文量
67
期刊介绍: European Journal of Political Research specialises in articles articulating theoretical and comparative perspectives in political science, and welcomes both quantitative and qualitative approaches. EJPR also publishes short research notes outlining ongoing research in more specific areas of research. The Journal includes the Political Data Yearbook, published as a double issue at the end of each volume.
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