Putra Oktavianto, Noor Anis Kundari, A. Saputra, Imam Abdurrosyid, Andri Saputra
{"title":"ANALISIS KESELAMATAN UNTUK MENCEGAH KECELAKAAN PADA PROSES EVAPORASI DI INSTALASI ELEMEN BAKAR EKSPERIMENTAL DENGAN METODE HAZOPS","authors":"Putra Oktavianto, Noor Anis Kundari, A. Saputra, Imam Abdurrosyid, Andri Saputra","doi":"10.55981/gnd.2023.6844","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"SAFETY ANALYSIS TO PREVENT ACCIDENTS IN THE EVAPORATION PROCESS AT EXPERIMENTAL FUEL ELEMENT INSTALLATION WITH THE HAZOPS METHOD. The Experimental Fuel Element Installation (IEBE) DPFK-BRIN has implemented safety standards as a safety reference using Hazard Identification Risk Assessment Determining Control (HIRADC). The HIRADC method has several lacks, so its application is not optimal. In this study, as a complement to the HIRADC method, a risk analysis was carried out using the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOPS). The hazard identification was carried out during the evaporation process of the uranyl nitrate solution in the E-601 evaporator tank. The HAZOPS method is based on process and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) to determine the potential hazards during evaporation. It is carried out by determining the nodes and parameters, analyzing deviations from each node or the potential danger of each node, the possible causes of deviations and their consequences, determining the likelihood scale and the level of risk, and making recommendations. Based on the assessment, six nodes were obtained, resulting in 11 deviations caused by 13 equipment malfunctions or failures. The risk assessment of 13 damages resulted in 1 potential low-hazard risk and 12 potential medium-hazard risks. The low-hazard risk category can be overcome by routine handling, such as preventive maintenance and regular equipment calibration. For the medium-hazard risk category, recommendations such as those for the low-hazard risk category and others are necessary to overcome deviations that may occur according to deviation type. According to safety assessment results, it can be concluded that HAZOPS can complement HIRADC to ensure safety is maintained during the process.","PeriodicalId":32551,"journal":{"name":"Ganendra Majalah IPTEK Nuklir","volume":"294 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ganendra Majalah IPTEK Nuklir","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.55981/gnd.2023.6844","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
SAFETY ANALYSIS TO PREVENT ACCIDENTS IN THE EVAPORATION PROCESS AT EXPERIMENTAL FUEL ELEMENT INSTALLATION WITH THE HAZOPS METHOD. The Experimental Fuel Element Installation (IEBE) DPFK-BRIN has implemented safety standards as a safety reference using Hazard Identification Risk Assessment Determining Control (HIRADC). The HIRADC method has several lacks, so its application is not optimal. In this study, as a complement to the HIRADC method, a risk analysis was carried out using the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOPS). The hazard identification was carried out during the evaporation process of the uranyl nitrate solution in the E-601 evaporator tank. The HAZOPS method is based on process and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) to determine the potential hazards during evaporation. It is carried out by determining the nodes and parameters, analyzing deviations from each node or the potential danger of each node, the possible causes of deviations and their consequences, determining the likelihood scale and the level of risk, and making recommendations. Based on the assessment, six nodes were obtained, resulting in 11 deviations caused by 13 equipment malfunctions or failures. The risk assessment of 13 damages resulted in 1 potential low-hazard risk and 12 potential medium-hazard risks. The low-hazard risk category can be overcome by routine handling, such as preventive maintenance and regular equipment calibration. For the medium-hazard risk category, recommendations such as those for the low-hazard risk category and others are necessary to overcome deviations that may occur according to deviation type. According to safety assessment results, it can be concluded that HAZOPS can complement HIRADC to ensure safety is maintained during the process.