{"title":"Cryptanalysis of a key exchange protocol based on a congruence-simple semiring action","authors":"A. Otero Sánchez, J. A. López Ramos","doi":"10.1142/s0219498825502299","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show that a previously introduced key exchange based on a congruence-simple semiring action is not secure by providing an attack that reveals the shared key from the distributed public information for any of such semirings.</p>","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219498825502299","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We show that a previously introduced key exchange based on a congruence-simple semiring action is not secure by providing an attack that reveals the shared key from the distributed public information for any of such semirings.