{"title":"“Blameworthiness” and “Culpability” are not Synonymous: A Sympathetic Amendment to Simester","authors":"Mitchell N Berman","doi":"10.1007/s11572-024-09722-x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>Andrew Simester’s new book</i>, Fundamentals of Criminal Law: Responsibility, Culpability, and Wrongdoing, <i>is a masterful analysis of the doctrines of the general part of the criminal law and the multiple, overlapping functions that those doctrines serve. Along the way, Simester makes explicit what criminal law theorists routinely presuppose—that the ordinary words “blameworthiness” and “culpability” pick out the same moral concept. This essay argues that this assumed equivalence is mistaken: two concepts are in play, not one. Roughly, to be blameworthy is to be justly liable to blaming practices in virtue of being at fault, and to be culpable is to act in a fashion that manifests or issues from insufficient concern for morally weighty interests. Culpability is not identical to blameworthiness, but rather a ground of blameworthiness: to be culpable is one way to be at fault, thus one way to be blameworthy. More importantly, culpability is not the exclusive ground of blameworthiness; an agent can be at fault, hence blameworthy, without being culpable. This essay defends these conceptual claims and draws forth some implications for two theses that Simester advances: that it is morally permissible to punish persons for criminal negligence and that it is unjust to punish persons who don’t deserve it.</i></p>","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-024-09722-x","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Andrew Simester’s new book, Fundamentals of Criminal Law: Responsibility, Culpability, and Wrongdoing, is a masterful analysis of the doctrines of the general part of the criminal law and the multiple, overlapping functions that those doctrines serve. Along the way, Simester makes explicit what criminal law theorists routinely presuppose—that the ordinary words “blameworthiness” and “culpability” pick out the same moral concept. This essay argues that this assumed equivalence is mistaken: two concepts are in play, not one. Roughly, to be blameworthy is to be justly liable to blaming practices in virtue of being at fault, and to be culpable is to act in a fashion that manifests or issues from insufficient concern for morally weighty interests. Culpability is not identical to blameworthiness, but rather a ground of blameworthiness: to be culpable is one way to be at fault, thus one way to be blameworthy. More importantly, culpability is not the exclusive ground of blameworthiness; an agent can be at fault, hence blameworthy, without being culpable. This essay defends these conceptual claims and draws forth some implications for two theses that Simester advances: that it is morally permissible to punish persons for criminal negligence and that it is unjust to punish persons who don’t deserve it.
期刊介绍：
Rationale The philosophy of crime and criminal law has been undergoing a renaissance.Increasing numbers of lawyers and philosophers are researching, writing and teaching in the area. Lawyers who are exploring theoretical issues related to criminal liability and punishment find that they must turn to philosophy. Philosophers recognise the importance of the criminal law as a focus for both analytical and normative inquiry. The practical importance of the subject is also obvious, especially at a time when western governments are having to reconsider their rationales for criminalization and sentencing in the light of substantial changes in criminal justice systems and their social contexts. Until recently, there was no journal solely devoted to the philosophy of crime and criminal law. Criminal Law and Philosophy fills this gap, and provides a platform for the high quality work that is being done in this area.
High quality content; specific and inclusive in scope Criminal Law and Philosophy aims to publish high quality articles that take a philosophical perspective on any issues in the broad field of crime and punishment. The main areas and topics include: crime and criminalization; the content, principles and structure of substantive criminal law; criminal justice and the criminal process; punishment and sentencing. The journal is inclusive in its scope: it publishes articles with a historical focus on earlier philosophical discussions of crime and punishment, as well as articles with a more contemporary focus. It seeks contributions from a range of philosophical schools and approaches, in particular both from analytically oriented philosophers and from those who draw more on contemporary continental philoshophy. Readership Criminal Law and Philosophy is becoming essential reading for academics in philoso phy, in law and in criminology who take a philosophically informed critical, analytical or normative approach to the criminal law and criminal justice. It is also an important resource for students in those subjects, and for practitioners with an interest in philosophical approaches to their practice. Through this journal, readers can access the latest thinking by the best scholars in the philosophy of crime and punishment. Editorial Board The editors, editorial board and advisors constitute an impressive, international group of leading scholars working in the philosophy of crime and punishment. They represent a variety of systems of criminal law, including systems that cross national boundaries.
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