ADAPT: Adaptive Camouflage Based Deception Orchestration For Trapping Advanced Persistent Threats

P. Charan, Subhasis Mukhopadhyay, Subhajit Manna, Nanda Rani, Ansh Vaid, Hrushikesh Chunduri, P. Anand, Sandeep K. Shukla
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Abstract

Honeypots serve as a valuable deception technology, enabling security teams to gain insights into the behaviour patterns of attackers and investigate cyber security breaches. However, traditional honeypots prove ineffective against advanced adversaries like APT groups due to their evasion tactics and awareness of typical honeypot solutions. This paper emphasises the need to capture these attackers for enhanced threat intelligence, detection, and protection. To address this, we propose the design and deployment of a customized honeypot network based on adaptive camouflaging techniques. Our work focuses on orchestrating a behavioral honeypot network tailored for three APT groups, with strategically positioned attack paths aligning with their Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, covering all cyber kill chain phases. We introduce a novel approach, deploying a camouflaged chatterbox application within the honeypot network. This application offers a regular chat interface while periodically tracking attacker activity by enabling periodic log transfers. Deployed for 100 days, our orchestrated honeypot recorded 13,906,945 hits from 4,238 unique IP addresses. Our approach categorizes attackers, discerning varying levels of sophistication, and identifies attacks from Hong Kong with similarities to known Chinese threat groups. This research significantly advances honeypot technology and enhances the understanding of sophisticated threat actors’ strategies in real operating networks.
ADAPT:基于自适应伪装的欺骗编排,用于诱捕高级持续性威胁
"巢穴 "是一种重要的欺骗技术,可使安全团队深入了解攻击者的行为模式,并调查网络安全漏洞。然而,传统 "巢穴 "对 APT 集团等高级攻击者无效,因为他们会采取规避策略,并对典型的 "巢穴 "解决方案有所了解。本文强调了捕获这些攻击者以增强威胁情报、检测和保护的必要性。为此,我们提出设计和部署基于自适应伪装技术的定制蜜罐网络。我们的工作重点是为三个 APT 组织量身定制一个行为 "蜜罐 "网络,并根据其 "战术、技术和程序 "对攻击路径进行战略定位,涵盖所有网络杀伤链阶段。我们引入了一种新方法,在蜜罐网络中部署一个伪装的聊天箱应用程序。该应用程序提供常规聊天界面,同时通过启用定期日志传输功能来定期跟踪攻击者的活动。部署 100 天后,我们精心策划的 "巢穴 "记录了来自 4,238 个独特 IP 地址的 13,906,945 次点击。我们的方法对攻击者进行了分类,分辨出不同复杂程度的攻击者,并识别出来自香港的攻击与已知的中国威胁组织有相似之处。这项研究极大地推动了蜜罐技术的发展,并加深了人们对真实运行网络中复杂威胁行为者策略的了解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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