Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal

IF 1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-03 DOI:10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778

Alec Hinshelwood

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We know our own intentional actions in a distinctively first-personal way. Many accounts of knowledge of intentionally doing something, A, assume that grounds for the knowledge would have to establ...

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实践中的摩尔悖论：行动知识如何成为第一个人知识

我们以一种独特的第一人称方式认识自己的有意行为。许多关于 "有意做某事 "A 的知识的论述都假定，这种知识的依据必须建立在......

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来源期刊

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Australasian Journal of Philosophy (AJP) is one of the world''s leading philosophy journals. Founded in 1923, it has been continuously published ever since. It is recognized as one of the best in the analytic tradition, but is not narrow in what it regards as worthy of acceptance. Heavily cited in the general philosophical literature, it is covered by all the major abstracting and indexing services, including the Arts and Humanities Citation Index® which provides access to current and retrospective bibliographic information and cited references found in the world''s leading arts and humanities journals. In addition to Articles and Discussion Notes, the journal publishes Book Reviews and Book Notes as well as occasional commissioned Critical Notices. The journal is read world-wide and has recently published contributions from North and South American, European and Asian as well as Australasian authors.