{"title":"Hashing to Elliptic Curves Through Cipolla–Lehmer–Müller’s Square Root Algorithm","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s00145-024-09490-w","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>The present article provides a novel hash function <span> <span>\\({\\mathcal {H}}\\)</span> </span> to any elliptic curve of <em>j</em>-invariant <span> <span>\\(\\ne 0, 1728\\)</span> </span> over a finite field <span> <span>\\({\\mathbb {F}}_{\\!q}\\)</span> </span> of large characteristic. The unique bottleneck of <span> <span>\\({\\mathcal {H}}\\)</span> </span> consists of extracting a square root in <span> <span>\\({\\mathbb {F}}_{\\!q}\\)</span> </span> as well as for most hash functions. However, <span> <span>\\({\\mathcal {H}}\\)</span> </span> is designed in such a way that the root can be found by (Cipolla–Lehmer–)Müller’s algorithm in constant time. Violation of this security condition is known to be the only obstacle to applying the given algorithm in the cryptographic context. When the field <span> <span>\\({\\mathbb {F}}_{\\!q}\\)</span> </span> is highly 2-adic and <span> <span>\\(q \\equiv 1 \\ (\\textrm{mod} \\ 3)\\)</span> </span>, the new batching technique is the state-of-the-art hashing solution except for some sporadic curves. Indeed, Müller’s algorithm costs <span> <span>\\(\\approx 2\\log _2(q)\\)</span> </span> multiplications in <span> <span>\\({\\mathbb {F}}_{\\!q}\\)</span> </span>. In turn, original Tonelli–Shanks’s square root algorithm and all of its subsequent modifications have the algebraic complexity <span> <span>\\(\\varTheta (\\log (q) + g(\\nu ))\\)</span> </span>, where <span> <span>\\(\\nu \\)</span> </span> is the 2-adicity of <span> <span>\\({\\mathbb {F}}_{\\!q}\\)</span> </span> and a function <span> <span>\\(g(\\nu ) \\ne O(\\nu )\\)</span> </span>. As an example, it is shown that Müller’s algorithm actually needs several times fewer multiplications in the field <span> <span>\\({\\mathbb {F}}_{\\!q}\\)</span> </span> (whose <span> <span>\\(\\nu = 96\\)</span> </span>) of the standardized curve NIST P-224.</p>","PeriodicalId":54849,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cryptology","volume":"234 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Cryptology","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-024-09490-w","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The present article provides a novel hash function \({\mathcal {H}}\) to any elliptic curve of j-invariant \(\ne 0, 1728\) over a finite field \({\mathbb {F}}_{\!q}\) of large characteristic. The unique bottleneck of \({\mathcal {H}}\) consists of extracting a square root in \({\mathbb {F}}_{\!q}\) as well as for most hash functions. However, \({\mathcal {H}}\) is designed in such a way that the root can be found by (Cipolla–Lehmer–)Müller’s algorithm in constant time. Violation of this security condition is known to be the only obstacle to applying the given algorithm in the cryptographic context. When the field \({\mathbb {F}}_{\!q}\) is highly 2-adic and \(q \equiv 1 \ (\textrm{mod} \ 3)\), the new batching technique is the state-of-the-art hashing solution except for some sporadic curves. Indeed, Müller’s algorithm costs \(\approx 2\log _2(q)\) multiplications in \({\mathbb {F}}_{\!q}\). In turn, original Tonelli–Shanks’s square root algorithm and all of its subsequent modifications have the algebraic complexity \(\varTheta (\log (q) + g(\nu ))\), where \(\nu \) is the 2-adicity of \({\mathbb {F}}_{\!q}\) and a function \(g(\nu ) \ne O(\nu )\). As an example, it is shown that Müller’s algorithm actually needs several times fewer multiplications in the field \({\mathbb {F}}_{\!q}\) (whose \(\nu = 96\)) of the standardized curve NIST P-224.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Cryptology is a forum for original results in all areas of modern information security. Both cryptography and cryptanalysis are covered, including information theoretic and complexity theoretic perspectives as well as implementation, application, and standards issues. Coverage includes such topics as public key and conventional algorithms and their implementations, cryptanalytic attacks, pseudo-random sequences, computational number theory, cryptographic protocols, untraceability, privacy, authentication, key management and quantum cryptography. In addition to full-length technical, survey, and historical articles, the journal publishes short notes.