{"title":"Electoral cycles in tax reforms","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s00181-024-02558-3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>We examine electoral cycles in tax reforms using monthly data over the period 1990–2018 for 22 advanced economies and emerging markets. We show that governments tend to avoid announcing tax reforms during the months running up to elections. In addition, they become more likely to announce those reforms in the first few months following elections, suggesting that “political capital" and/or “political opportunity" channels play a role in the timing of reforms. These patterns are broad-based regarding changes in the tax base and rates, and for various types of taxes. We also find that the pre-election decrease in the likelihood of tax reform announcements appears to be stronger in emerging markets, and weaker in countries with relatively better institutional quality. Finally, our results indicate that neither fiscal rules nor IMF programs seem to have differential effects on electoral cycles in tax reforms.</p>","PeriodicalId":11642,"journal":{"name":"Empirical Economics","volume":"240 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Empirical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-024-02558-3","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
We examine electoral cycles in tax reforms using monthly data over the period 1990–2018 for 22 advanced economies and emerging markets. We show that governments tend to avoid announcing tax reforms during the months running up to elections. In addition, they become more likely to announce those reforms in the first few months following elections, suggesting that “political capital" and/or “political opportunity" channels play a role in the timing of reforms. These patterns are broad-based regarding changes in the tax base and rates, and for various types of taxes. We also find that the pre-election decrease in the likelihood of tax reform announcements appears to be stronger in emerging markets, and weaker in countries with relatively better institutional quality. Finally, our results indicate that neither fiscal rules nor IMF programs seem to have differential effects on electoral cycles in tax reforms.
期刊介绍：
Empirical Economics publishes high quality papers using econometric or statistical methods to fill the gap between economic theory and observed data. Papers explore such topics as estimation of established relationships between economic variables, testing of hypotheses derived from economic theory, treatment effect estimation, policy evaluation, simulation, forecasting, as well as econometric methods and measurement. Empirical Economics emphasizes the replicability of empirical results. Replication studies of important results in the literature - both positive and negative results - may be published as short papers in Empirical Economics. Authors of all accepted papers and replications are required to submit all data and codes prior to publication (for more details, see: Instructions for Authors).The journal follows a single blind review procedure. In order to ensure the high quality of the journal and an efficient editorial process, a substantial number of submissions that have very poor chances of receiving positive reviews are routinely rejected without sending the papers for review.Officially cited as: Empir Econ
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