Do women on boards break the glass ceiling or face the glass cliff?

E. Poma, Barbara Pistoresi
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Abstract

Purpose This paper aims to appraise the effectiveness of gender quotas in breaking the glass ceiling for women on boards (WoBs) in companies that are legally obliged to comply with quotas (listed companies and state-owned companies, LP) and in those that are not (unlisted companies and nonstate-owned companies, NLNP). Furthermore, it investigates the glass cliff phenomenon, according to which women are more likely to be appointed to apical positions in underperforming companies. Design/methodology/approach A balanced panel data of the top 116 Italian companies by total assets, which are present in both 2010 and 2017, is used for estimating ANOVA tests across sectors and fixed-effects panel regression models. Findings WoBs significantly increased in both the LP and the NLNP companies, and this increase was greater in the financial sector. Furthermore, the relationship between the percentage of WoBs and firm performance is not linear but depends on the financial corporate health. Specifically, the situation in which a woman ascends to a leadership position in challenging circumstances where the risk of failure is high (glass cliff phenomenon) is only present in companies with the lowest performance in the sample, in other words, when negative values of Roe and negative or zero values of Roa occur together. Practical implications These findings have relevant policy implications that encourage the adoption of gender quotas even in specific top positions, such as CEO or president, as this could lead to a “double spillover effect” both vertically, that is, in other job positions, and horizontally, toward other companies not targeted by quotas. Practical interventions to support women in glass cliff positions, on the other hand, relate to the extent of supervisor mentoring and support to prevent women from leaving director roles and strengthen their chances for career advancement. Originality/value The authors explore the ability of gender quotas to break through the glass ceiling in companies that are not legally obliged to do so, and to the best of the authors’ knowledge, for the first time, the glass cliff phenomenon in the Italian context.
董事会中的女性是要打破玻璃天花板,还是要面对玻璃悬崖?
目的 本文旨在评估性别配额在打破董事会中女性的玻璃天花板方面的有效性,包括在有法律义务遵守配额的公司(上市公司和国有公司,LP)和没有法律义务遵守配额的公司(非上市公司和非国有公司,NLNP)。此外,它还调查了玻璃悬崖现象,根据该现象,女性更有可能被任命到业绩不佳的公司担任高层职位。设计/方法/途径采用 2010 年和 2017 年意大利总资产排名前 116 位公司的平衡面板数据,对各行业进行方差分析检验,并使用固定效应面板回归模型进行估计。此外,女员工比例与公司业绩之间不是线性关系,而是取决于公司的财务健康状况。具体来说,只有在样本中业绩最低的公司,换句话说,当 Roe 值为负值、Roa 值为负值或零值的情况同时出现时,才会出现女性在失败风险很高的挑战环境中登上领导岗位的情况(玻璃悬崖现象)。这些发现具有相关的政策含义,鼓励采用性别配额,即使是在特定的高层职位,如首席执行官或总裁,因为这可能导致 "双重溢出效应",即纵向溢出到其他工作岗位,横向溢出到配额未针对的其他公司。另一方面,为处于玻璃悬崖职位的女性提供支持的实际干预措施涉及到主管指导和支持的程度,以防止女性离开董事职位,并增加其职业晋升的机会。 原创性/价值 作者探讨了性别配额在没有法律义务的公司中突破玻璃天花板的能力,据作者所知,这是第一次在意大利的背景下探讨玻璃悬崖现象。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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