The 'No-Supervenience' Theorem and its Implications for Theories of Consciousness

IF 1.6 4区 心理学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Catherine M. Reason
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by the no-supervenience theorem, except for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally.
无超验 "定理及其对意识理论的启示
无监督 "定理(Reason,2019;Reason and Shah,2021)证明,没有一个完全自我意识的系统能够完全监督任何客观可观测的系统。我在此对该证明进行了简单、非技术性的总结,并展示了它对四种不同意识理论的影响:戴维-查尔默斯的 "属性二元论 "理论;马克斯-维尔曼斯的 "反身一元论";盖伦-斯特劳森的 "现实一元论";以及基思-弗兰基什的 "幻觉论"。研究表明,除了查尔默斯的理论之外,所有这些理论的现有形式都被无监督定理排除在外,我的研究表明,查尔默斯的理论要求人类做出非理性的行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
14.30%
发文量
58
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