{"title":"Arab State Narratives on Normalization with Israel: Justifying Policy Reversal","authors":"M. Hallward, Taib Biygautane","doi":"10.1177/23477989231220444","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When the Abraham Accords were announced in 2020, some lauded these deals as a groundbreaking advancement in Israeli–Arab relations, whereas others saw them as backstabbing the Palestinians. The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API), largely ignored by Israel, offered normalized relations with Israel in exchange for withdrawal from the 1967 Occupied Territories, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and a resolution to the Palestinian refugee situation. However, the four Arab states that established relations with Israel under the aegis of the Abraham Accords did so despite Israel’s failure to fulfill API conditions. Given the dismay of many in the region regarding this move and the turnaround in decades of official policy toward Israel, this article investigates the rationale provided by the Arab states for making this diplomatic shift, drawing on quantitative and qualitative data. The study examines the messaging of Arab states and analyzes the economic, geostrategic, and sociocultural justifications in the official media outlets of the four states—the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, including comparisons with US and UK press. Specifically, it seeks to understand the justifications Arab state elites provided for shifting their policies toward Israel despite the historical conditions set by the API and whether they acknowledge the concerns of Palestinians in their discussion of the Accords. Quantitative findings suggest that media coverage of cooperation varied across the Arab signatories. The coverage in the UAE and Bahrain tended to be more frequent, optimistic, and focused on general and economic cooperation with Israel. In comparison, there tended to be more varied media coverage of the Accords in Sudan and Morocco. Qualitatively, results show that overall economic justifications tended to be used more frequently, and Morocco used sociocultural explanations more than others. Further, the agreements were not presented as peace agreements, unlike how the Accords were discussed in the US and UK press.","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/23477989231220444","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
When the Abraham Accords were announced in 2020, some lauded these deals as a groundbreaking advancement in Israeli–Arab relations, whereas others saw them as backstabbing the Palestinians. The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API), largely ignored by Israel, offered normalized relations with Israel in exchange for withdrawal from the 1967 Occupied Territories, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and a resolution to the Palestinian refugee situation. However, the four Arab states that established relations with Israel under the aegis of the Abraham Accords did so despite Israel’s failure to fulfill API conditions. Given the dismay of many in the region regarding this move and the turnaround in decades of official policy toward Israel, this article investigates the rationale provided by the Arab states for making this diplomatic shift, drawing on quantitative and qualitative data. The study examines the messaging of Arab states and analyzes the economic, geostrategic, and sociocultural justifications in the official media outlets of the four states—the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, including comparisons with US and UK press. Specifically, it seeks to understand the justifications Arab state elites provided for shifting their policies toward Israel despite the historical conditions set by the API and whether they acknowledge the concerns of Palestinians in their discussion of the Accords. Quantitative findings suggest that media coverage of cooperation varied across the Arab signatories. The coverage in the UAE and Bahrain tended to be more frequent, optimistic, and focused on general and economic cooperation with Israel. In comparison, there tended to be more varied media coverage of the Accords in Sudan and Morocco. Qualitatively, results show that overall economic justifications tended to be used more frequently, and Morocco used sociocultural explanations more than others. Further, the agreements were not presented as peace agreements, unlike how the Accords were discussed in the US and UK press.