Amphibians and the Particular-Universal Distinction

IF 1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI:10.1080/00048402.2023.2264860

Chiao-Li Ou

引用次数: 0

Abstract

I defend a new conception of the particular-universal distinction based on considerations about what David Lewis calls ‘amphibians’. I argue, first, that given the possibility of amphibians, two re...

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两栖动物与特殊性和普遍性的区别

我基于对戴维-刘易斯所说的 "两栖动物 "的思考，为特殊-普遍区别的新概念辩护。首先，我认为，鉴于两栖动物存在的可能性，有两个方面需要考虑。

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来源期刊

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Australasian Journal of Philosophy (AJP) is one of the world''s leading philosophy journals. Founded in 1923, it has been continuously published ever since. It is recognized as one of the best in the analytic tradition, but is not narrow in what it regards as worthy of acceptance. Heavily cited in the general philosophical literature, it is covered by all the major abstracting and indexing services, including the Arts and Humanities Citation Index® which provides access to current and retrospective bibliographic information and cited references found in the world''s leading arts and humanities journals. In addition to Articles and Discussion Notes, the journal publishes Book Reviews and Book Notes as well as occasional commissioned Critical Notices. The journal is read world-wide and has recently published contributions from North and South American, European and Asian as well as Australasian authors.