Triggering the tragedy: The simulated effects of alternative fisher goals on marine fisheries and fisheries policy

Abstract

Avoiding the ‘tragedy of the commons’ remains a challenge in many natural resource systems, and open-access fisheries are well-studied in this context. Here, an agent-based model is used to investigate how variation in fisher goals change what policies best solve the tragedy. When fishers’ goals are easily satisfied, commons problems are avoided without management interventions, but the imposition of quota limits triggers the tragedy. Thus, commons problems are not necessarily inevitable and sophisticated governance institutions or regulations are not always required to manage them; the same policy may prevent the tragedy or trigger it, depending on the fisher's goals. Given that it is difficult to ascertain them, by using a simulation model we can find patterns that help us identify fishers' goals and incorporate these patterns within our management procedure. This can assist adaptive management to better incorporate behaviour into policy evaluation.