VoWi-Fi security threats: Address resolution protocol attack and countermeasures

IF 1.3 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
IET Networks Pub Date : 2024-01-17 DOI:10.1049/ntw2.12113
Kuan-Chu Lu, I.-Hsien Liu, Keng-Hao Chang, Jung-Shian Li
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

B5G/6G networks are facing challenges in the deployment of additional base stations. However, Taiwan's four major operators have launched VoWi-Fi calling services to maintain signal quality and coverage for customers. These services pose potential threats when users connect to untrusted Wi-Fi networks. Therefore, the authors utilised commercial equipment to study the security of VoWi-Fi calling services offered by Taiwan's four major telecom companies. The authors employed address resolution protocol attack methods to develop two verification attacks that bypass existing security measures: one for dropping session initiation protocol packets and the other for dropping voice call packets, both capable of circumventing current security defences. Through real-world experiments, the authors confirmed their feasibility and assessed their potential harm. Consequently, two defence methods are proposed. The first is an anti-attack algorithm for app and device manufacturers to detect the security of the user's calling environment. The second is a recommendation for telecom operators to implement new detection mechanisms to safeguard user rights.

The cover image is based on the Case Study VoWi-Fi security threats: Address resolution protocol attack and countermeasures by Kuan-Chu Lu et al., https://doi.org/10.1049/ntw2.12113

Abstract Image

VoWi-Fi 安全威胁:地址解析协议攻击与对策
B5G/6G 网络在部署更多基站方面面临挑战。不过,台湾的四大运营商已经推出了 VoWi-Fi 通话服务,以保持用户的信号质量和覆盖范围。当用户连接到不信任的 Wi-Fi 网络时,这些服务会带来潜在威胁。因此,作者利用商业设备研究了台湾四大电信公司提供的 VoWi-Fi 通话服务的安全性。作者采用地址解析协议攻击方法,开发了两种绕过现有安全措施的验证攻击:一种是丢弃会话启动协议数据包,另一种是丢弃语音呼叫数据包,这两种攻击都能规避当前的安全防御措施。通过实际实验,作者证实了这两种攻击的可行性,并评估了其潜在危害。因此,作者提出了两种防御方法。第一种是供应用程序和设备制造商使用的反攻击算法,用于检测用户通话环境的安全性。第二种是建议电信运营商实施新的检测机制,以保障用户权益。
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来源期刊
IET Networks
IET Networks COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS-
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
审稿时长
33 weeks
期刊介绍: IET Networks covers the fundamental developments and advancing methodologies to achieve higher performance, optimized and dependable future networks. IET Networks is particularly interested in new ideas and superior solutions to the known and arising technological development bottlenecks at all levels of networking such as topologies, protocols, routing, relaying and resource-allocation for more efficient and more reliable provision of network services. Topics include, but are not limited to: Network Architecture, Design and Planning, Network Protocol, Software, Analysis, Simulation and Experiment, Network Technologies, Applications and Services, Network Security, Operation and Management.
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