The Diagonal Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From “Displacement” through “Agency” to “Scope” and Beyond

IF 1.5 Q1 LAW
C. Nagy
{"title":"The Diagonal Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From “Displacement” through “Agency” to “Scope” and Beyond","authors":"C. Nagy","doi":"10.1017/glj.2023.94","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n The application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to the Member States has given rise both to a controversial phraseology and a controversial case-law. This paper offers a reconstruction of the constitutional intent and proposes a conceptualization in conformity with the structural function and the constitutional contemplation of the pouvoir constituent. As to the phraseological debate, it demonstrates that the Charter’s application to the Member States may occur by reason of either “implementation” or “interpretation” of EU law and the two strands are embraced but not synthetized by “scope” as a collective term. As to the substantive debate, it demonstrates that the CJEU’s case-law on “implementation” is not only amorphous but also inconsistent with the Charter’s constitutional mandate. The paper proposes a novel approach based on the notion that the application to the Member States is accessory to the supremacy of EU law. The paper’s argument is presented in the following steps. First, the paper presents the pristine rationale and constitutional function of the application to the Member State through its emergence and historical context. Second, it provides a taxonomy and critical overview of the CJEU’s amorphous case-law and presents the Court’s futile attempt to create a coherent doctrine that faithfully reproduces the constitutional contemplation behind the diagonal application and that reflects the division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Third, it sets out the proposed doctrine of “displacement.”","PeriodicalId":36303,"journal":{"name":"German Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"German Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.94","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to the Member States has given rise both to a controversial phraseology and a controversial case-law. This paper offers a reconstruction of the constitutional intent and proposes a conceptualization in conformity with the structural function and the constitutional contemplation of the pouvoir constituent. As to the phraseological debate, it demonstrates that the Charter’s application to the Member States may occur by reason of either “implementation” or “interpretation” of EU law and the two strands are embraced but not synthetized by “scope” as a collective term. As to the substantive debate, it demonstrates that the CJEU’s case-law on “implementation” is not only amorphous but also inconsistent with the Charter’s constitutional mandate. The paper proposes a novel approach based on the notion that the application to the Member States is accessory to the supremacy of EU law. The paper’s argument is presented in the following steps. First, the paper presents the pristine rationale and constitutional function of the application to the Member State through its emergence and historical context. Second, it provides a taxonomy and critical overview of the CJEU’s amorphous case-law and presents the Court’s futile attempt to create a coherent doctrine that faithfully reproduces the constitutional contemplation behind the diagonal application and that reflects the division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Third, it sets out the proposed doctrine of “displacement.”
欧盟基本权利宪章》的对角线应用:从 "流离失所 "到 "代理 "再到 "范围 "及其他
欧盟基本权利宪章》对成员国的适用引起了措辞上的争议和判例法上的争议。本文对宪法意图进行了重构,并提出了一种符合结构功能和宪法构想的构想。关于措辞上的争论,本文表明,《宪章》对成员国的适用可能是由于对欧盟法律的 "实施 "或 "解释",而 "范围 "作为一个集合术语包含了这两个方面,但并没有将其综合起来。至于实质性辩论,它表明欧盟法院关于 "实施 "的判例法不仅不明确,而且不符合《宪章》的宪法授权。本文基于对成员国的适用是欧盟法律至高无上的附属这一概念,提出了一种新颖的方法。本文的论证分为以下几个步骤。首先,本文通过对成员国适用的产生和历史背景,介绍了对成员国适用的基本原理和宪法功能。其次,本文对欧盟法院无定式的判例法进行了分类和批判性概述,并介绍了欧盟法院徒劳地试图创建一种连贯的理论,以忠实地再现对角线适用背后的宪法理念,并反映欧盟与其成员国之间的权限划分。第三,它提出了拟议的 "位移 "理论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
German Law Journal
German Law Journal Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
2.70
自引率
7.70%
发文量
75
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信