{"title":"Military directors and stock price informativeness: What's all the fuss about?","authors":"Tasawar Nawaz, Tahseen Nawaz","doi":"10.1007/s11156-023-01240-6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Exploiting a unique hand-built dataset, belonging to non-financial firms, operating in an emerging economy, this study, first of its kind, reports that stock prices of firms with military-experienced board of directors reflect more firm specific information after controlling for board attributes, agent heterogeneity and firm level variation. The results robust to alternative specifications of informativeness and military director proxy support the notion that military-trained directors may enhance transparency in public listed companies and encourage the incorporation of more firm-specific information into stock prices. Further analysis suggests that military directors may enfeeble CEO–board nexus and settle the directional variations at the corporate board level: military directors bring discipline in the board room that translates into rigorous CEO monitoring and improved corporate governance quality.</p>","PeriodicalId":47688,"journal":{"name":"Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting","volume":"211 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-023-01240-6","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Exploiting a unique hand-built dataset, belonging to non-financial firms, operating in an emerging economy, this study, first of its kind, reports that stock prices of firms with military-experienced board of directors reflect more firm specific information after controlling for board attributes, agent heterogeneity and firm level variation. The results robust to alternative specifications of informativeness and military director proxy support the notion that military-trained directors may enhance transparency in public listed companies and encourage the incorporation of more firm-specific information into stock prices. Further analysis suggests that military directors may enfeeble CEO–board nexus and settle the directional variations at the corporate board level: military directors bring discipline in the board room that translates into rigorous CEO monitoring and improved corporate governance quality.
期刊介绍：
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting deals with research involving the interaction of finance with accounting, economics, and quantitative methods, focused on finance and accounting. The papers published present useful theoretical and methodological results with the support of interesting empirical applications. Purely theoretical and methodological research with the potential for important applications is also published. Besides the traditional high-quality theoretical and empirical research in finance, the journal also publishes papers dealing with interdisciplinary topics.
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