Israel and the Palestinians: The Day After

Abstract

Abstract Hamas’s unprecedentedly brutal and indiscriminate attack against Israel on 7 October 2023 has probably permanently derailed, or at least substantially delayed, prospects for a two-state solution. Israel is likely to conclude that its most fundamental demand for any peace agreement – ironclad security arrangements – cannot be achieved. Even if a centrist Israeli government emerges following the war, the most the Palestinians can probably hope for is heightened autonomy, not full independence. Israel may show greater willingness to consider civil disengagement – that is, the dismantling of settlements in those parts of the West Bank that it would not wish to retain in a final peace settlement, probably over 90% of them – but with the Israel Defense Forces fully deployed throughout the area. Saudi–Israeli normalisation has been postponed, but may be salvageable, especially if the Saudis take an active role in the peace process and in reinstating the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Growing tensions could diminish the extraordinary US–Israeli strategic cooperation that arose immediately after the attack.