A Statistical Verification Method of Random Permutations for Hiding Countermeasure Against Side-Channel Attacks

Abstract

As NIST is putting the final touches on the standardization of PQC (Post Quantum Cryptography) public key algorithms, it is a racing certainty that peskier cryptographic attacks undeterred by those new PQC algorithms will surface. Such a trend in turn will prompt more follow-up studies of attacks and countermeasures. As things stand, from the attackers' perspective, one viable form of attack that can be implemented thereupon is the so-called"side-channel attack". Two best-known countermeasures heralded to be durable against side-channel attacks are:"masking"and"hiding". In that dichotomous picture, of particular note are successful single-trace attacks on some of the NIST's PQC then-candidates, which worked to the detriment of the former:"masking". In this paper, we cast an eye over the latter:"hiding". Hiding proves to be durable against both side-channel attacks and another equally robust type of attacks called"fault injection attacks", and hence is deemed an auspicious countermeasure to be implemented. Mathematically, the hiding method is fundamentally based on random permutations. There has been a cornucopia of studies on generating random permutations. However, those are not tied to implementation of the hiding method. In this paper, we propose a reliable and efficient verification of permutation implementation, through employing Fisher-Yates' shuffling method. We introduce the concept of an n-th order permutation and explain how it can be used to verify that our implementation is more efficient than its previous-gen counterparts for hiding countermeasures.