{"title":"What Becomes of the Damned","authors":"R. A. J. Shields","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.65443","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Annihilationism provides a fruitful point of contact between philosophers and theologians for further reflection on nonexistence. In this paper I articulate a key commitment of annihilationism; namely, that some persons cease to exist. Such a commitment, I argue, amounts to the claim that some persons exist at time t and then do not exist at t+1, become ‘annihilated objects.’ Claims about annihilated objects induct the annihilationist into a wider realism/anti-realism debate about nonexistent objects. I survey some major viewpoints in this debate. I then draw out some implications for each view for the annihilationist’s commitment to annihilated objects. I show that annihilationism is consistent with some forms of realism and anti-realism and inconsistent with others.","PeriodicalId":507361,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","volume":"31 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.65443","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Annihilationism provides a fruitful point of contact between philosophers and theologians for further reflection on nonexistence. In this paper I articulate a key commitment of annihilationism; namely, that some persons cease to exist. Such a commitment, I argue, amounts to the claim that some persons exist at time t and then do not exist at t+1, become ‘annihilated objects.’ Claims about annihilated objects induct the annihilationist into a wider realism/anti-realism debate about nonexistent objects. I survey some major viewpoints in this debate. I then draw out some implications for each view for the annihilationist’s commitment to annihilated objects. I show that annihilationism is consistent with some forms of realism and anti-realism and inconsistent with others.
湮灭论为哲学家和神学家进一步反思不存在问题提供了一个富有成效的接触点。在本文中,我阐明了湮灭论的一个关键承诺,即有些人不再存在。我认为,这种承诺等同于这样一种主张,即有些人在 t 时存在,但在 t+1 时不存在了,成为'湮灭的客体'。关于湮灭客体的主张将湮灭论者卷入了一场关于不存在客体的更广泛的现实主义/反现实主义之争。我将概述这场争论中的一些主要观点。然后,我引出每种观点对湮灭论者对湮灭客体的承诺的一些影响。我表明,湮灭论与某些形式的现实主义和反现实主义是一致的,而与另一些形式的现实主义和反现实主义则是不一致的。