Inheritance of power in the 21st century: legal mechanisms for the transfer of presidential powers to controlled viceroys and family members in authoritarian regimes

Liana Spytska
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Abstract

This study investigates the prevalence of presidential clans in authoritarian regimes, particularly in Central Asian countries, and their impact on political processes and power transitions. Different methodological approaches were used to study the role of the president, differentiate between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, and analyze post-Soviet clan communities. The research found that the governmental form influences the president's functions and powers, and that institutional reforms and elections in authoritarian regimes often serve to legitimize elite agreements. The study also examined power transitions in post-Soviet Central Asia, noting the importance of informal agreements and historical traditions in maintaining balance of power. However, it was revealed that the practice of transferring power within presidential clans hinders modern political processes and state development. The experience of power transitions in countries like Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan were considered, each exhibiting unique risks and advantages related to succession or dynastic inheritance. It was found that the elites of the post-Soviet republics operate based on traditions and historically formed the mechanism of power, which has become a key aspect in determining the balance of power. The practical value of the identified results is to provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the transit of power, highlighting their advantages and disadvantages.
21 世纪的权力继承:专制政权中将总统权力移交给受控总督和家庭成员的法律机制
本研究调查了专制政权中总统部族的普遍性,尤其是在中亚国家,以及它们对政治进程和权力过渡的影响。研究采用了不同的方法论来研究总统的作用,区分专制政权和极权政权,并分析后苏联宗族社会。研究发现,政府形式会影响总统的职能和权力,专制政权的体制改革和选举往往会使精英协议合法化。研究还考察了苏联解体后中亚地区的权力过渡,注意到非正式协议和历史传统在维持权力平衡方面的重要性。然而,研究显示,在总统部族内部进行权力交接的做法阻碍了现代政治进程和国家发展。会议研究了吉尔吉斯斯坦、哈萨克斯坦和阿塞拜疆等国的权力交接经验,这些国家在权力继承或王朝继承方面都表现出独特的风险和优势。研究发现,苏联解体后各共和国的精英们在传统的基础上运作,并在历史上形成了权力机制,这已成为决定权力平衡的一个关键方面。所确定结果的实用价值在于对权力过渡的有效性进行评估,突出其优势和劣势。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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