{"title":"Indian Navy’s Submarine Development Programme: A Critical Assessment","authors":"K. G. Ramkumar, Prakash Panneerselvam","doi":"10.1177/23477970231207258","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the twenty-first century, undersea warfare is changing. The role of submarines and ASW is also adapting to the new maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific region. The Submarine arm of the Indian Navy plays a crucial role in this region. Except for the four recently inducted Scorpene submarines, the other conventional submarines are more than two decades old. India’s ageing submarine fleet calls for greater focus on submarine acquisition. The 30-year (2000–2030) submarine building plan drawn up in 1998 envisaged the development of two parallel lines of six conventional submarines, to be constructed in India over twelve years. This is to be followed by 12 submarines of indigenous design based on the learning curve of the two lines to be constructed over the next twelve years. But, as of now, Project 75 has been planned for six submarines (with French design) in 2006, of which five are on active duty and the last one is undergoing sea trials. Project 75I has been sanctioned to build six submarines but with a new model involving two Indian firms, with the introduction of a strategic partner from the private sector to encourage their participation in the ‘Make in India’ policy. Despite India’s capability to design, develop, build and operate strategic submarines with very high indigenous content, India’s lack of capability to design conventional submarines raises the following questions, which this paper has tried to address: Is it related to inadequacies in capability or policy decision-making? Are there inconsistencies in defence procurement policy/procedure? Is there a need to evaluate the Strategic Partnership model before implementation? Is there a lack of access to technology?","PeriodicalId":42502,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs","volume":"106 1","pages":"395 - 416"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970231207258","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In the twenty-first century, undersea warfare is changing. The role of submarines and ASW is also adapting to the new maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific region. The Submarine arm of the Indian Navy plays a crucial role in this region. Except for the four recently inducted Scorpene submarines, the other conventional submarines are more than two decades old. India’s ageing submarine fleet calls for greater focus on submarine acquisition. The 30-year (2000–2030) submarine building plan drawn up in 1998 envisaged the development of two parallel lines of six conventional submarines, to be constructed in India over twelve years. This is to be followed by 12 submarines of indigenous design based on the learning curve of the two lines to be constructed over the next twelve years. But, as of now, Project 75 has been planned for six submarines (with French design) in 2006, of which five are on active duty and the last one is undergoing sea trials. Project 75I has been sanctioned to build six submarines but with a new model involving two Indian firms, with the introduction of a strategic partner from the private sector to encourage their participation in the ‘Make in India’ policy. Despite India’s capability to design, develop, build and operate strategic submarines with very high indigenous content, India’s lack of capability to design conventional submarines raises the following questions, which this paper has tried to address: Is it related to inadequacies in capability or policy decision-making? Are there inconsistencies in defence procurement policy/procedure? Is there a need to evaluate the Strategic Partnership model before implementation? Is there a lack of access to technology?