Impact of Supply Risk Sharing on Supply Chains: Multiplicative vs. Additive Risks

Junhyun Bae, Ji-Hung (Ryan) Choi
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Abstract

Abstract We consider a supply chain in which a retailer orders from a manufacturer(s) who face(s) a stochastic supply risk (random yield) under single or dual-sourcing cases. In specific, we look into this problem in two different yield risks: multiplicative and additive. One might intuit that if the retailer shares a manufacturer’s random yield risk with the manufacturer, the manufacturer will be better off. Interestingly, we confirm that this intuition is only valid in the additive yield risk but not necessarily in the multiplicative yield risk. Moreover, under dual sourcing, both manufacturers fiercely compete on their prices (i.e., Bertrand-like competition) to become the sole source in the additive yield risk, but the manufacturers do not compete as much in the multiplicative yield risk. Lastly, this paper shows that the supply chain inefficiency may decrease (increase) as risk-sharing increases in the additive risk model under dual sourcing (single sourcing) while it does not changeinthemultiplicativeriskmodel. Key words: supply risk, random yield, dual sourcing, game theory JEL Classification: L11, M11, M21
供应风险分担对供应链的影响:乘法风险与加法风险
摘要 我们考虑了这样一个供应链:零售商向制造商订货,而制造商在单源或双源情况下面临随机供应风险(随机产量)。具体地说,我们研究了两种不同产量风险下的问题:乘法风险和加法风险。人们可能会直觉地认为,如果零售商与制造商分担制造商的随机产量风险,制造商的收益会更好。有趣的是,我们证实这种直觉只适用于加法收益风险,而不一定适用于乘法收益风险。此外,在双重采购的情况下,两家制造商会在价格上展开激烈竞争(即伯特兰式竞争),以成为加法收益风险中的唯一来源,但在乘法收益风险中,制造商之间的竞争并不激烈。最后,本文表明,在双采购(单采购)的加法风险模型中,供应链的低效率可能会随着风险分担的增加而降低(增加),而在乘法收益风险模型中则不会改变。 关键词:供应风险、随机产量、双重采购、博弈论 JEL 分类:L11, M11, M21L11、M11、M21
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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