Incentive modeling analysis in engineering applications and projects with stochastic duration time

J. Zhao, J.F. Su
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Abstract

Incentives are quite common to be utilized in engineering applications such as some infrastructure development projects or construction projects. Due to the increasing complexity of construction management and the continuing trend towards outsourcing of component or engineering outsourcing activities, we focus on the issue of incentive design. Time collaboration is one of the main focuses of random project duration time in parallel projects. In this article, we consider a setting where a manufacturer outsources two parallel subtasks to two different suppliers, and the manufacturer is time sensitive. On the premise that the project completion time follows the exponential distribution, some models are established to compare the proposed incentives and we get the comparative analysis of the proposed incentives. This paper puts forward three kinds of time-based incentive mechanisms, namely, deadline incentive mechanism, competition mechanism and mixed incentive mechanism. We do modeling analysis for all incentive mechanisms. We get the optimal work rates determined by suppliers and compare various incentive mechanisms to maximize manufacturers' profits.
具有随机持续时间的工程应用和项目中的激励模型分析
激励机制在工程应用中十分常见,如一些基础设施开发项目或建筑项目。由于施工管理的复杂性不断增加,以及组件或工程外包活动的持续趋势,我们将重点放在激励设计问题上。时间协作是并行项目中随机项目工期时间的重点之一。在本文中,我们考虑这样一种情况:制造商将两个并行的子任务外包给两个不同的供应商,制造商对时间非常敏感。在项目完成时间服从指数分布的前提下,建立了一些模型来比较所提出的激励措施,并对所提出的激励措施进行了比较分析。本文提出了三种基于时间的激励机制,即限期激励机制、竞争机制和混合激励机制。我们对所有激励机制进行了建模分析。我们得到了由供应商决定的最优工作率,并对各种激励机制进行了比较,以实现制造商利润的最大化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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