Unintentional Evolution: The Rise of Reciprocal Altruism

Humans Pub Date : 2023-12-31 DOI:10.3390/humans4010002
Sergio Da Silva, Sergio Bonini
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Abstract

In this study, we propose a groundbreaking hypothesis for the evolution of reciprocal altruism, suggesting its emergence from random encounters characterized by theft rather than the traditionally accepted cooperative reciprocation and intertemporal choice. We challenge the conventional theory, critiquing its circular reasoning that presupposes cooperation to explain its own origin. Our approach posits that theft, when passively tolerated during times of abundance, does not negatively impact survival and reproduction. This leads to a novel understanding of cooperation as a form of “tolerated theft”. To support our theory, we developed a Python-based simulation model that succinctly demonstrates how this mechanism could operate. Our key finding is that in environments where theft is tolerated, offspring may evolve to overlook such acts, eventually emerging as reliable reciprocators in times of scarcity. This hypothesis, while potentially controversial due to its originality, opens up new perspectives on the accidental evolution of reciprocal altruism and encourages a reevaluation of the fundamental mechanisms driving cooperative behaviors.
无意的进化互惠利他主义的兴起
在这项研究中,我们对互惠利他主义的进化提出了一个开创性的假设,认为它是从以偷窃为特征的随机相遇中产生的,而不是传统上公认的合作互惠和时际选择。我们对传统理论提出了挑战,批判了它以合作为前提来解释自身起源的循环论证。我们的方法假设,在丰裕时期被动容忍的偷窃行为不会对生存和繁殖产生负面影响。这使我们对合作这种 "宽容的偷窃 "形式有了新的理解。为了支持我们的理论,我们开发了一个基于 Python 的模拟模型,简明扼要地展示了这种机制是如何运作的。我们的主要发现是,在容忍偷窃的环境中,后代可能会进化到忽视这种行为,最终在稀缺时期成为可靠的互惠者。这一假说虽然因其独创性而可能引起争议,但它为互惠利他主义的意外进化开辟了新的视角,并鼓励人们重新评估驱动合作行为的基本机制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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