Unintentional Evolution: The Rise of Reciprocal Altruism

Abstract

In this study, we propose a groundbreaking hypothesis for the evolution of reciprocal altruism, suggesting its emergence from random encounters characterized by theft rather than the traditionally accepted cooperative reciprocation and intertemporal choice. We challenge the conventional theory, critiquing its circular reasoning that presupposes cooperation to explain its own origin. Our approach posits that theft, when passively tolerated during times of abundance, does not negatively impact survival and reproduction. This leads to a novel understanding of cooperation as a form of “tolerated theft”. To support our theory, we developed a Python-based simulation model that succinctly demonstrates how this mechanism could operate. Our key finding is that in environments where theft is tolerated, offspring may evolve to overlook such acts, eventually emerging as reliable reciprocators in times of scarcity. This hypothesis, while potentially controversial due to its originality, opens up new perspectives on the accidental evolution of reciprocal altruism and encourages a reevaluation of the fundamental mechanisms driving cooperative behaviors.