On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments

IF 1.4 3区哲学 Q2 ETHICS

Philosophical Psychology Pub Date : 2023-12-30 DOI:10.1080/09515089.2023.2296580

Víctor M. Verdejo

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligib...

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论思维插入判断的合理性

经历过思维插入的受试者不承认他们内省意识到的想法。根据我所谓的 "合理性假设"，思维插入报告不仅是智能的，也是理性的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Philosophical Psychology Multiple-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

14.30%

发文量

120

期刊介绍： Philosophical Psychology is an international journal devoted to developing and strengthening the links between philosophy and the psychological sciences, both as basic sciences and as employed in applied settings, by publishing original, peer-refereed contributions to this expanding field of study and research. Published articles deal with issues that arise in the cognitive and brain sciences, and in areas of applied psychology.