Veto powers and access capabilities in the design of preferential trade agreements

IF 3.7 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Review of International Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-12-28 DOI:10.1080/09692290.2023.2279048

Ninfa M. Fuentes-Sosa

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Studies of domestic political actors’ influence on the design of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have focused on veto players as obstacles to policy change, assuming their roles as access poin...

查看原文本刊更多论文

优惠贸易协定设计中的否决权和准入能力

关于国内政治行为体对优惠贸易协定（PTAs）设计的影响的研究主要集中在作为政策变革障碍的否决权行为体上，认为他们的角色是准入点。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Review of International Political Economy Multiple-

CiteScore

9.20

自引率

9.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Political Economy is a peer-reviewed journal welcoming constructive and critical contributions in all areas of political economy, including the Austrian, Behavioral Economics, Feminist Economics, Institutionalist, Marxian, Post Keynesian, and Sraffian traditions. The Review publishes both theoretical and empirical research, and is also open to submissions in methodology, economic history and the history of economic thought that cast light on issues of contemporary relevance in political economy. Comments on articles published in the Review are encouraged.