{"title":"Lottocracy or psephocracy? Democracy, elections, and random selection","authors":"Daniel Hutton Ferris","doi":"10.1177/14748851231220555","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Would randomly selecting legislators be more democratic than electing them? Lottocrats argue (reasonably) that contemporary regimes are not very democratic and (more questionably) that replacing elections with sortition would mitigate elite capture and improve political decisions. I argue that a lottocracy would, in fact, be likely to perform worse on these metrics than a system of representation that appoints at least some legislators using election – a psephocracy (from psēphizein, to vote). Even today's actually existing psephocracies, which are far from ideally democratic, are better suited than a lottocracy would be to meet the demands of democratic citizenship (politics must be legible to ordinary people, who must have low-cost opportunities to participate) and the demands of democratic leadership (powerful representatives should be specialized and constrained by competitions for popular support). Democrats therefore have weighty instrumental reasons to reject lottocracy and work to democratize psephocracy, instead.","PeriodicalId":46183,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Political Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14748851231220555","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Would randomly selecting legislators be more democratic than electing them? Lottocrats argue (reasonably) that contemporary regimes are not very democratic and (more questionably) that replacing elections with sortition would mitigate elite capture and improve political decisions. I argue that a lottocracy would, in fact, be likely to perform worse on these metrics than a system of representation that appoints at least some legislators using election – a psephocracy (from psēphizein, to vote). Even today's actually existing psephocracies, which are far from ideally democratic, are better suited than a lottocracy would be to meet the demands of democratic citizenship (politics must be legible to ordinary people, who must have low-cost opportunities to participate) and the demands of democratic leadership (powerful representatives should be specialized and constrained by competitions for popular support). Democrats therefore have weighty instrumental reasons to reject lottocracy and work to democratize psephocracy, instead.
期刊介绍:
The European Journal of Political Theory provides a high profile research forum. Broad in scope and international in readership, the Journal is named after its geographical location, but is committed to advancing original debates in political theory in the widest possible sense--geographical, historical, and ideological. The Journal publishes contributions in analytic political philosophy, political theory, comparative political thought, and the history of ideas of any tradition. Work that challenges orthodoxies and disrupts entrenched debates is particularly encouraged. All research articles are subject to triple-blind peer-review by internationally renowned scholars in order to ensure the highest standards of quality and impartiality.