The President’s Role(s) in the Law-Making Process in Uganda

IF 0.3 Q3 LAW
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Articles 79(1) and (2) of the Constitution of Uganda provide that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, only Parliament or a person or body authorized by Parliament, has the power to make laws. Article 91 provides ways in which the President participates in the law-making process. I examine the Hansard of the 10th Parliament of Uganda (May 2016—May 2021) to demonstrate how the President invoked Article 91 to, inter alia, return Bills to Parliament or to decline to assent to Bills. The 10th Parliament passed 118 Bills, seven Bills were withdrawn and the President returned 11 Bills. The Hansard show that: (i) in most of the cases, Parliament amended the Bills to address the President’s concerns; (ii) there are instances in which Parliament appears to disregard the Constitution especially in cases where the President has exceeded the constitutional time limit within which he must assent to Bills; (iii) Parliament applied different methodologies to gather the information it needed to revise the Bills and (iv) in a few cases, Parliament disagreed with the President and declined to change the returned clauses of the Bills. The article shows, inter alia, that the President wielded enormous powers in the law-making process contrary to what was envisaged by the drafters of the Constitution. It is argued, inter alia, that in reconsidering the Bills returned by the President, Parliament should not ignore the issue of public participation otherwise the Acts may be declared unconstitutional. It is also argued, basing on the drafting history of the Constitution, that the 30-day period within which the President is required to assent to a Bill excludes Sundays and public holidays. However, it includes Saturdays.
总统在乌干达法律制定过程中的作用
乌干达宪法》第 79 条第(1)款和第(2)款规定,在不违反《宪法》规定的情况下, 只有议会或议会授权的个人或机构有权制定法律。第 91 条规定了总统参与法律制定过程的方式。我研究了乌干达第 10 届议会(2016 年 5 月至 2021 年 5 月)的会议记录,以说明总统如何援引第 91 条,除其他外,将法案退回议会或拒绝同意法案。第 10 届议会通过了 118 项法案,7 项法案被撤回,总统退回了 11 项法案。立法记录显示(i)在大多数情况下,议会对法案进行了修订,以解决总统的关切;(ii)在一些情况下,议会似乎无视《宪法》,特别是在总统超过宪法规定的必须同意法案的时限的情况下;(iii)议会采用不同的方法收集修订法案所需的信息;(iv)在少数情况下,议会不同意总统的意见,拒绝修改退回的法案条款。文章特别指出,总统在立法过程中拥有巨大的权力,这与宪法起草者的设想背道而驰。文章特别指出,在重新审议总统退回的法案时,议会不应忽视公众参与问题,否则可能会宣布这些法案违宪。根据《宪法》的起草历史,还有人辩称,要求总统同意法案的 30 天期限不包括星期日和公共节假日。但是,它包括星期六。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
期刊介绍: The principal objectives of the Review are to provide a vehicle for the consideration of the legislative process, the use of legislation as an instrument of public policy and of the drafting and interpretation of legislation. The Review, which was first established in 1980, is the only journal of its kind within the Commonwealth. It is of particular value to lawyers in both private practice and in public service, and to academics, both lawyers and political scientists, who write and teach within the field of legislation.
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