Justice in benefitting from carbon removal

IF 4.6 Q2 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES
Dominic Lenzi, H. Schübel, Ivo Wallimann-Helmer
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Abstract

Abstract Non-Technical Summary Climate stabilization requires scaling-up technologies to capture and store carbon. Carbon removal could be very profitable, and some of the agents best placed to benefit are ‘carbon majors’, i.e. fossil fuel companies. We argue that in ordinary circumstances only agents without significant historical climate responsibilities would be entitled to the full benefits from carbon removal. Under non-ideal conditions, carbon majors might be entitled to benefit, provided that no other agent could remove similar quantities of carbon at similar costs. This burden of proof is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities. Technical Summary Climate stabilization requires scaling up technologies to capture and store carbon. Some of the agents best placed to profit from carbon removal are ‘carbon majors’, especially fossil fuel companies. Yet incentivizing carbon majors to undertake carbon removal poses an ethical dilemma: carbon majors have made significant historical contributions to climate change and have significantly benefitted from such contributions without being made to compensate for resulting climate harm. This is why it seems unfair to reward them with additional economic benefits. However, carbon majors possess the technological skills and infrastructure to upscale carbon removal efficiently. We argue that in ordinary circumstances, only agents without significant climate responsibilities would be morally entitled to fully benefit from carbon removal. Yet under non-ideal conditions, it might be permissible to reward carbon majors if no other agent were capable of removing as much carbon at similar costs and on similar timeframes. We believe this argument faces an imposing burden of proof that is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities. In more favorable circumstances, including those of most OECD countries, rewarding carbon majors without having them pay for their historical climate responsibilities remains impermissible. Social Media Summary Rewarding carbon majors to undertake carbon dioxide removal is unjust due to their historical climate responsibilities. Where possible, governments should empower other agents to remove CO2.
从碳清除中受益的公正性
气候稳定需要大规模的技术来捕获和储存碳。除碳可能是非常有利可图的,一些最有可能受益的代理商是“碳巨头”,即化石燃料公司。我们认为,在一般情况下,只有没有重大历史气候责任的主体才有资格从碳去除中获得全部利益。在非理想条件下,如果没有其他药剂能够以同样的成本去除同样数量的碳,那么碳巨头可能会受益。这种举证责任只有在治理能力较差的国家才有可能得到履行。气候稳定需要扩大碳捕获和储存技术的规模。一些最能从碳去除中获利的机构是“碳巨头”,尤其是化石燃料公司。然而,鼓励大型碳公司进行碳清除会带来一个道德困境:大型碳公司对气候变化做出了重大的历史贡献,并从这些贡献中获得了巨大的利益,而没有为由此造成的气候损害做出补偿。这就是为什么用额外的经济利益奖励他们似乎是不公平的。然而,碳专业拥有技术技能和基础设施,可以有效地提高碳去除水平。我们认为,在一般情况下,只有没有重大气候责任的主体才有资格从碳去除中充分受益。然而,在非理想条件下,如果没有其他代理能够以类似的成本和类似的时间框架去除同样多的碳,那么可能允许奖励碳巨头。我们认为,这一论点面临着沉重的举证责任,只有在治理能力较差的国家才有可能做到这一点。在更有利的情况下,包括大多数经合组织国家,奖励碳巨头而不让它们为其历史气候责任买单,这是不允许的。鉴于碳专业的历史气候责任,奖励他们承担二氧化碳减排任务是不公平的。在可能的情况下,政府应该授权其他机构去除二氧化碳。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Global Sustainability
Global Sustainability Environmental Science-Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
CiteScore
10.90
自引率
3.60%
发文量
19
审稿时长
17 weeks
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