Muhammad Suhail Rizwan, Anum Qureshi, Irfan Ullah Sahibzada
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper empirically examines the moderating role of country-level governance indicators (CGIs) in the relationship between macro-prudential policy instruments (MPI) and systemic risk. Results from 68 countries, during the period 2000–2017, show that CGIs in terms of corruption controls, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law play a negative moderating role in the MPI-systemic risk nexus. Countries scoring high (low) on these CGIs experience stability benefits (instability costs) from MPIs. These findings suggest that the mere implementation of macro-prudential regulations may not perform the intended function of systemic stability. Overall, institutional development in a country’s governance ecosystem is necessary; hence, a coordinated effort is required from all the stakeholders of the country.
期刊介绍：
Under the guidance of its highly respected Editors and an eminent and truly international Editorial Board?Journal of Banking Regulation?has established itself as one of the leading sources of authoritative and detailed information on all aspects of law and regulation affecting banking institutions.Journal of Banking Regulation?publishes in each quarterly issue detailed briefings analyses and updates which are of direct relevance to practitioners working in the field while meeting the highest intellectual standards.Journal of Banking Regulation?publishes the latest thinking and best practice on:Basel I II and IIIModels for banking supervisionInternational accounting standardsDeposit protectionEnforcement decisions in banking regulation and supervisionCross-border competition in banking servicesCorporate governance in banksHarmonisation in banking marketsSupervising credit riskAnti-money laundering legislation and regulationsMonetary integrationRisk capital and capital adequacySystemic risk in banking operationsCross-border regulationCross-border bank insolvencyModels for banking riskEssential reading for:central bankersbanking supervisorsfinancial regulatorsbankerscompliance officersheads of risk managementpolicy makersbank associationslawyers specialising in banking lawaccountantsinternal and external bank auditorsacademics and researchers
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