{"title":"Which governance mechanisms matter for firm pollution?","authors":"Sarfraz Khan , John K. Wald","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2023.101297","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div><span>Using U.S. EPA pollution data, we analyze which governance provisions are related to firm pollution. We find that classified boards, poison pills, limits to amend bylaws, and fair price amendments are associated with significantly greater pollution. In contrast, cumulative voting, because it allows a greater voice for minority shareholders, is associated with lower pollution. We create a pollution-based index (the P-index) based on the sum of those governance provisions positively related to pollution plus an indicator for lack of cumulative voting. The P-index has approximately twice as large an association with firm-level pollution as the E-index. Most measures of </span>board structure or compensation have no significant relation with pollution after controlling for the P-index. An instrumental variable analysis suggests a causal relation between the P-index and pollution.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"57 5","pages":"Article 101297"},"PeriodicalIF":9.4000,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"British Accounting Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0890838923001592","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Using U.S. EPA pollution data, we analyze which governance provisions are related to firm pollution. We find that classified boards, poison pills, limits to amend bylaws, and fair price amendments are associated with significantly greater pollution. In contrast, cumulative voting, because it allows a greater voice for minority shareholders, is associated with lower pollution. We create a pollution-based index (the P-index) based on the sum of those governance provisions positively related to pollution plus an indicator for lack of cumulative voting. The P-index has approximately twice as large an association with firm-level pollution as the E-index. Most measures of board structure or compensation have no significant relation with pollution after controlling for the P-index. An instrumental variable analysis suggests a causal relation between the P-index and pollution.
期刊介绍:
The British Accounting Review*is pleased to publish original scholarly papers across the whole spectrum of accounting and finance. The journal is eclectic and pluralistic and contributions are welcomed across a wide range of research methodologies (e.g. analytical, archival, experimental, survey and qualitative case methods) and topics (e.g. financial accounting, management accounting, finance and financial management, auditing, public sector accounting, social and environmental accounting; accounting education and accounting history), evidence from UK and non-UK sources are equally acceptable.