Do Security Analysts Discipline Credit Rating Agencies?

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Corporate Finance Studies Pub Date : 2022-05-19 DOI:10.1093/rcfs/cfac021

Kingsley Fong, Harrison Hong, Marcin Kacperczyk, Jeffrey D Kubik

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Credit ratings of corporations are biased, but the forces driving this bias are unclear. We argue it would be difficult for rating agencies to issue high grades for a firm’s debt when there are a lot of objective equity analyst reports about the firm’s earnings that are informative about its default. We find that an exogenous drop in analyst coverage leads to greater optimism-bias in ratings, especially for firms with little bond analyst coverage and those that are close to default. This coverage-induced shock leads to less informative ratings about future defaults and downgrades and more subsequent bond security mispricings.

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证券分析师惩戒信用评级机构吗?

企业的信用评级存在偏见，但造成这种偏见的原因尚不清楚。我们认为，当有大量客观的股票分析师关于公司收益的报告提供了有关公司违约的信息时，评级机构很难对公司的债务给予高评级。我们发现，分析师覆盖范围的外生下降会导致评级中更大的乐观偏见，特别是对于那些几乎没有债券分析师覆盖的公司和那些接近违约的公司。这种由覆盖范围引发的冲击，导致有关未来违约和评级下调的评级信息不足，以及随后更多的债券证券错误定价。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Corporate Finance Studies BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

17.80

自引率

1.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS) is dedicated to publishing high-quality research in the expansive field of Corporate Finance. The journal seeks original contributions, reviewing papers based on their unique insights into Corporate Finance. This encompasses a wide spectrum, including a firm's interactions with stakeholders, capital markets, internal organization structure, compensation mechanisms, corporate governance, and capital management. RCFS also welcomes research in financial intermediation, financial institutions, microstructure, and the implications of asset pricing for Corporate Finance. The journal considers theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers for review.